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From the State of Emergency to the Rule of Law: The
Evolution of Repressive Legality in the Nineteenth
Century British Empire
Christopher Roberts ∗

Abstract
Why are contemporary laws and techniques that state authorities use to crack down on
political dissent so similar across countries? This Article argues that at least part of the answer
may be found by turning to colonial history. The Article has two Parts. In the first Part, the
Article explores the manner in which, over the course of the nineteenth century, the British
deployed various different legal and institutional approaches in response to an Irish polity that
consistently refused to submit to British authority. In the second Part, the Article examines the
manner in which the approaches developed in Ireland were exported to other parts of the empire,
in particular to India, South Africa, and Nigeria, over the course of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Along the way, the Article considers the big picture significance of such
developments relative to the nature of the rule of law. While, over time, the deployment of
increasingly legalized and formalized approaches may have played a positive role insofar as they
served to soften and displace the potential for more direct violence, enabled by declarations of
martial law, such developments came at the cost of the incorporation of much of the repressive
approach employed in contexts of emergency rule into everyday legality. Far from conflicting with
the rule of law, this development represented the form in which the expansion of the rule of law
primarily occurred—serving to entrench and legitimize the repressive practices in question.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
Across the former British Empire, human rights advocates encounter similar
modes of rights violations in country after country. Among the repressive
techniques encountered are declarations of states of emergency, often
accompanied by the use of special and military tribunals; 1 a reliance upon overmilitarized security services, generally operating with impunity; 2 the imposition of
collective punishments; 3 limitations on and the use of excessive force against
assemblies; 4 controls on the press and trials of those mounting public criticisms
on charges of sedition or libel; 5 and sharp limits to the formation and operation
of civil society associations. 6

1

2

See, for example, Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria, Communication 224/98, AFRICAN COMMISSION
ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (Nov. 6, 2000), http://perma.cc/964X-SM2E; Centre for Free
Speech v. Nigeria, Communication 206/97, AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’
RIGHTS (Nov. 15, 1999), http://perma.cc/XE2F-N4KV; Egypt: 7,400 Civilians Tried in Military
Courts: Torture, Disappearances Used to Elicit Confessions, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 13, 2016),
http://perma.cc/4DQ4-YH5X; The Military Courts, B’TSELEM (Nov. 11, 2017),
http://perma.cc/9PZ5-FEQE.
See, for example, Meenakshi Ganguly, Security Forces in India Engage in Extrajudicial Killings, Then Are
Protected: Protests against Shopian Encounter Killings Are a Reminder that Security Forces Need Deep Reforms,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 20, 2018), http://perma.cc/C5PF-BXLD; Priscilla Nyagoah,
Sudanese National Intelligence Service Empowered to Violate Human Rights, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
(Mar. 19, 2015), http://perma.cc/5ZRL-5KWK.

3

See, for example, Israel: Surge in Unlawful Palestinian Home Demolitions: 126 in West Bank Left Homeless,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 22, 2015), http://perma.cc/3GYC-P33L; Mass Trials and the Death
Penalty in Egypt, REPRIEVE US (Apr. 4, 2018), http://perma.cc/C9CJ-SQG7; Nigeria: Military
Massacres Unpunished: Obasanjo’s Human Rights Progress Called into Question, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Apr. 1, 2002), http://perma.cc/96BM-8N7Z; Pakistan: End Collective Punishment in Swat: Forced
Evictions, House Demolitions Undermine Fight against Taliban, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 22, 2010),
http://perma.cc/DFZ2-RUAV.

4

See, for example, AFTE, EIPR, & CIHRS, THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY IN EGYPT (Mar.
15, 2014), http://perma.cc/T74F-Z7TP; Amnesty International Public Statement: South Africa: Investigate
Excessive Use of Force against “Fees Must Fall” Protesters, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL SOUTHERN AFRICA
REGIONAL OFFICE (Nov. 14, 2016), http://perma.cc/NQ7Y-RTGQ; Blind to Justice: Excessive Use of
Force and Attacks on Health Care in Jammu and Kashmir, India, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Dec.
1, 2016), http://perma.cc/Y569-Y9KS.
See, for example, India: Crackdown on Freedom of Expression Must End, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (Feb.
17, 2016), http://perma.cc/H742-DSLT; Israel’s Attacks on Press Freedom Violate Right to Freedom of
Expression, AL HAQ (Oct. 30, 2017), http://perma.cc/Q7EN-P86D; “Not Worth the Risk”: Threats to
Free Expression ahead of Kenya’s 2017 Elections, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2017),
http://perma.cc/Q257-ESQ6.

5

6

See, for example, Close Case 173, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (July 19, 2018), http://perma.cc/25ATWU3T; India: End Legal Restrictions against Civil Society, ISHR (May 26, 2015), http://perma.cc/L459D9H5; Israeli Knesset Approves Controversial Law Targeting Foreign-Government Funding for NGOs, FIDH
(July 18, 2016), http://perma.cc/P43Q-GMTG.
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When, where, how and why did these techniques of repression arise, and
how did they develop over time? The history of such measures is, needless to say,
complex. One thing is clear however—the history of these measures cannot be
recounted without considering the history of global empire. Inevitably, imperial
rule was met with local resistance, though naturally the forms of that resistance
varied from place to place and time to time. In response, imperial powers
developed a new range of tools in order to suppress local resistance. Such new
modes of repression, in turn, gave rise to new modes of resistance. Thus,
resistance and repression quickly became locked in a cycle of mutually reinforcing
coevolution.
This Article tracks the development of such repressive legal tools in the most
extensive and powerful global empire, the British Empire, by examining the
development of such tools in Ireland over the course of the nineteenth century
and their subsequent dissemination across the empire in the years that followed.
In most instances such measures were not adopted according to some grand
scheme or design, but rather on an ad hoc basis in response to particular
challenges and according to contingent features of local situations at different
moments in time. Nonetheless, once new tools of repression were adopted, they
had a tendency to become entrenched and to proliferate—testifying to the fact
that repressive powers are much more readily agglomerated than they are stripped
away.

A. Theorizing Emergency Rule
The repressive regimes in question bear a complex relationship to the idea
of military or emergency rule. 7 Emergency rule was seen as troubling in the British
Empire both due to the conflict between the measures taken in such a situation
and ‘rule of law’ norms, 8 as well as due to the fact that declaring martial law was
tantamount to admitting a particular situation had gotten out of control, an
admission of failure on the part of the authorities. The repressive regimes
examined in this Article were hence seen as superior to emergency rule, insofar as
they replaced it with a more regularized legal order. At the same time, however,
the repressive approaches adopted in such a context did not simply replace
emergency rule with an entirely separate order. Rather, they invariably ended up

7

8

“Emergency rule” and “emergency law” herein are meant to refer to the general category of
exceptional, discretionary, executive-power governance, generally recognized as problematic, but
justified in the name of some overarching “emergency”-related concern. “Military rule,” “military
law,” and “martial law” refer to a sub-category of emergency rule, in which the military in particular
is granted enhanced powers in a certain area. Various typical component features of martial law in
the British context are discussed below.
See RANDE W. KOSTAL, A JURISPRUDENCE OF POWER 462–88 (2005).

4
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incorporating various components of that rule into an increasingly standardized,
routinized everyday legal practice.
A natural place one might look to obtain a better understanding of how and
why this took place is the scholarly literature on states of exception and emergency
rule more broadly. There are two prominent branches in this literature—one more
theoretical, one more practical. On the theoretical side, three authors stand out.
First, Carl Schmitt has been particularly influential. In simplest terms, Schmitt
argues that exceptional situations will arise from time to time; that any attempt to
limit by law the recourse to, and the boundaries of, exceptional measures will be
doomed to failure; and that this is not a bad thing, as the ability to proceed through
exceptional measures is necessary in order to meet the emergencies that will be
faced. 9 Schmitt’s argument is hence open to challenge on numerous grounds.
Normatively, his support of the state of exception is problematic given the
political trajectory of his career. 10 Descriptively, Schmitt’s account is criticized on
the grounds that it is overly existential, 11 overly focused on major events, and
overly credulous and supportive of those who claim that certain situations are in
fact “emergencies” that justify the imposition of exceptional measures. Moreover,
Schmitt’s work is also subject to critique because of its narrow focus on the
manner in which states of exception and emergency have been declared and
deployed historically, while ignoring how the legal situations stemming from such
declarations and deployments have evolved in practice.
Giorgio Agamben heavily relied upon Schmitt’s account. 12 In contrast to
Schmitt, Agamben sought to limit recourse to states of exception, based in
significant part on his fear that they might become entrenched, a process that he
argued had occurred within Nazi Germany as well as in the post-9/11 U.S., at
least relative to presumed “enemy” detainees. 13 Despite his adoption of a more
sympathetic normative stance, however, Agamben’s work ultimately replicated
many of the other problematic characteristics of Schmitt’s text, both by continuing
to emphasize major moments of exceptional law, rather than more mundane and
9

See generally CARL SCHMITT, DICTATORSHIP: FROM THE ORIGIN OF THE MODERN CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY TO PROLETARIAN CLASS STRUGGLE (1921); CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY:
FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (1922); CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF
THE POLITICAL (1932).

10

Carl Schmitt joined the Nazi party on May 1, 1933, and went on to serve as a prominent Nazi jurist
for the next three and a half years. See CLAUDIA KOONZ, THE NAZI CONSCIENCE 58–9 (2003). For
extensive contemplation of the meaning of Schmitt’s joining of the Nazi party, together with an
assessment of his critique of liberalism generally, see JOHN MCCORMICK, CARL SCHMITT’S CRITIQUE
OF LIBERALISM: AGAINST POLITICS AS TECHNOLOGY (1997).
See Andrew Norris, Sovereignty, Exception, and Norm, 34 J. L. & SOC’Y 31 (2007).

11
12
13

See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (2005).
See id. at §§ 1.2–1.3.
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ongoing processes of exceptional legality, and by writing an abstract,
existentialized account instead of a more concretely and historically-grounded
one.
The third frequently-encountered major theoretical reference point for state
of exception debates is Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Violence. 14 Benjamin’s
approach is more promising than Schmitt’s or Agamben’s due to its greater
recognition that what is deemed ‘exceptional’ violence is actually found in the
everyday operations of the law. Despite its merits, however, Benjamin’s text is
limited by its more “messianic” elements, 15 which impede Benjamin’s ability to
articulate a more functional or grounded critique.
In addition to these more theoretical texts, there is also a substantial body of
more pragmatic work addressing emergency rule. In particular, in the years after
the attacks on the U.S. on 9/11, a number of prominent legal scholars weighed in
on the debate on emergency powers. These scholars took different positions on
the question of how to most effectively limit the danger that comes with the
deployment of emergency powers. Some contended emergency powers should be
quarantined entirely outside the law to prevent the possibility of infection. 16
Others suggested such a position was overstated, and argued that in fact it is
possible to contain and limit the harms caused by exceptional measures through
legal means, including both ex ante rules and ex post review. 17 Others still contended

14

15

16

17

See WALTER BENJAMIN, Critique of Violence, in 1 WALTER BENJAMIN: SELECTED WRITINGS (Michael
Bullock & Michael W. Jennings eds., 2004).
As Derrida puts it, Benjamin’s Critique of Violence is perhaps best described as “messianico-marxist”;
see Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 920,
1045 (Mary Quaintance trans., 1990). The troubling messianic element of Benjamin’s text arises
most centrally from the importance he attaches to an elusive concept of ‘divine violence’ in which
he seems to locate many of his hopes for systemic change.
Oren Gross was the chief exponent of this point of view. See Oren Gross, Extra-Legality and the
Ethic of Political Responsibility, in EMERGENCIES AND THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY (Victor Ramraj ed.,
2008); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112
YALE L.J. 1011 (2003); Oren Gross, Providing for the Unexpected: Constitutional Emergency Provisions, 33
ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 13 (2003).
For a variety of positions within this broad sphere, see David Dyzenhaus, The Compulsion of Legality,
in EMERGENCIES AND THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY (Victor Ramraj ed., 2008); David Dyzenhaus, The
State of Emergency in Legal Theory, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY (2005); Bruce
Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004); David Cole, Judging the Next
Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Time of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565 (2003); David
Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution’s Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753 (2004); David
Dyzenhaus, Humpty Dumpty Rules or the Rule of Law: Legal Theory and the Adjudication of National Security,
28 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 1 (2003); John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of Exception: A
Typology of Emergency Powers, 2 INT’L J. CON. L. 210 (2004); Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of
Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PENN. J. CON. L. 1001 (2004); Laurence
H. Tribe & Patrick O. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801 (2004).
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neither avenue can save us, and that we must rely instead on democratic political
opposition. 18
The diverse suggestions offered by such authors as to how to best limit and
fight back against the harmful spillover effects of emergency law are thoughtful
and worthy of sustained contemplation. At the same time, thanks to the extent to
which the more recent “emergency” sparked by 9/11 occupies the center of their
attention, such authors have generally failed to delve in depth into the concrete,
messy, and often comparatively mundane long history of the manner in which
emergency powers have been deployed and have evolved in practice.
This failure to closely examine the history has helped to obscure much of
the reality of contemporary emergency governance. While our attention is
captured by exceptional events, our ability to discern the exceptional is measured
only by the rubric of what we do, and do not, take for granted. The question that
should be posed, in contrast, is to what extent exceptional legality already informs
the institutions and legal systems under which we live. 19

B. The Rule of Law
The reality of the contemporary situation becomes clearer if we shift our
focus from the state of exception to its purported opposite: the rule of law. While
these two concepts are generally supposed to be at odds, on closer inspection it
becomes apparent that they are in fact closely intertwined.
In order to see why, it is necessary to understand the nature of the rule of
law as such. The concept of the rule of law is often associated with certain positive
characteristics. On a narrower view, the concept of the rule of law is associated
with certain key principles of legality—including for example the principles of
clarity and of universality. On a broader view, the rule of law encompasses all such
basic principles, together with essential human rights guarantees.
On a more fundamental level, however, the rule of law simply requires and
refers to governance by a regime that can reasonably be described as legal. For
18

19

See, for example, Mark Tushnet, Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN
WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005); See also Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional
Process Approach to Rights during Wartime, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM
AND COMPLACENCY (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005).
Mark Neocleous’s work is a relatively rare early exception to this trend, and tacks a course entirely
in accordance with that developed here. See Mark Neocleous, The Problem with Normality: Taking
Exception to “Permanent Emergency”, 31 ALTERNATIVES 191 (2006). Nassar Hussain’s work also points
in such a direction, in terms of its emphasis on the close and little understood interrelationships
between the ideas of emergency rule, colonialism, and the rule of law; see NASSAR HUSSAIN, THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF EMERGENCY: COLONIALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW (2003). More recently, John
Reynolds has compellingly made a similar point, in a brilliant work entirely aligned with the
argumentation presented here; see JOHN REYNOLDS, EMPIRE, EMERGENCY AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2017).
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example, in some states, the rule of law may exist when the authorities promulgate
laws that play a key role in advancing the project of governance.
This does not describe every situation, of course. Often, before authorities
are able to extend such a legal form of power, they will expand their reach through
pure, discretionary power. When this discretionary power is replaced by legal
power, it may come as a relief because a more immediate and violent rule is being
replaced by a more regularized and predictable one.
While the rule of law may be less immediately violent, it is stronger and more
effective. In promulgating laws, establishing and extending the reach of court
systems, and employing and deploying prosecutors and policemen, central
authorities are able to extend their reach over an increasingly expansive area while
asserting tighter control over an increasingly extensive set of affairs. The extension
of the ‘rule of law’ is, hence, first and foremost a project through which lawmakers expand their power.
On an abstract level, it seems at first blush plausible that such an advance
might be achieved in a purely positive manner—as discretionary, suppressive
authority is replaced by an impartial, clearly defined order respectful of individual
liberty and rights. History, however, tells a different story. The rest of this Article
explores the manner in which the rule of law replaced the more immediate
emergency and discretionary rule in one particular context—imperial Britain in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The first portion of the Article examines the manner in which, over the
course of the long nineteenth century, the British attempted—after a period of
more exceptional, emergency governance—to bring Ireland under the control of
the law. This was not a process of extending rights to the Irish, however, but
rather one of attempting to find the most effective methods of limiting Irish
opposition to British rule.
British control in this context developed in several phases. In the early
period, British approaches were largely responsive, that is, geared at responding
in a reactive manner to the forms of resistance the British encountered. To
counter resistance, the British developed repressive approaches and directly
incorporated these approaches into the law, albeit typically in a piecemeal or
carefully contained and delimited manner. As time went on, the British became
savvier and found more effective ways to present the modes of control they were
developing, including, for instance, by portraying them as crime control. At the
same time, the forms of control in question also gradually evolved. More explicitly
martial law-reminiscent approaches were replaced by controls over expression, the
press, associations, and assemblies. In addition, new institutions—a more
professionalized (and in the colonial context, quasi-military) police force and
judiciary, public prosecutors, and a new, modern intelligence service—were
developed and deployed, providing the authorities with new means of expanding
the power and reach of the law.
8
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While the new modes of legality that were evolving in colonial Ireland were
more moderate than emergency law per se, they were also more pernicious insofar
as they incorporated many components of emergency legality into a more
legitimized and normalized frame. In sum, the story of the evolution of repressive
legislation in Ireland is a story of the incorporation of many of the repressive
potentials of emergency governance into a strengthened and legitimized form of
everyday legality.
However, the history explored below does not end there. While
developments in Ireland were particularly important, if they had applied in Ireland
alone, their power and relevance would be comparatively limited. Instead, the
approaches to repressive public order legality that developed there would come to
be exported and disseminated more widely. The second portion of this Article
considers the manner in which the repressive approaches developed in Ireland
over the course of the nineteenth century were transferred to other British colonial
territories, a process which occurred with particular intensity around the end of
the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. As in Ireland, such
laws generally replaced a more extreme and discretionary, but also weaker, preexisting legal frame. Wider dissemination signified the growing force and
acceptance of such approaches, and helped to further entrench their visibility and
acceptance as basic components of governance in turn. The end result of this
process of experimentation, dissemination, and normalization was not only to
extend a repressive legal and institutional archetype across much of the globe, but
also ultimately to make that archetype seem like the very model of the rule of law.

II. T HE I R ISH L ABORATORY
The account that follows will explore the manner in which, over the course
of the nineteenth century, emergency law gradually gave way to a more
regularized, legalized approach to control in Ireland. While this transition may
have taken some of the edge off the worst potentials of emergency law, in many
other ways the situation became more problematic as the repressive functions of
emergency law were transferred into a less harsh, but more effective, legal form.
In the British context, emergency law has generally been synonymous with
martial law. The history of martial law is a long and convoluted one, which has
formed a major matter of discussion for British legal theorists from the early
modern period on. 20 It is not the intention to delve into these debates here, which
20

On martial law and its contested meaning within British history, see KOSTAL, supra note 8 (“As
matters stood in October 1865, English lawyers did not agree even on the definition of the term
‘martial law.’ The relevant literature contained at least three distinct meanings. According to the
famous statement of Lord Wellington during the Ceylon debate of 1851, the term was a misnomer;
martial law was not law at all, but the ‘will of the General who commands the Army’ . . . In another

Summer 2019

9

Chicago Journal of International Law

would necessitate a piece of much greater length. It will suffice instead, for present
purposes, to highlight a few key features. Most broadly, the fact that the scope
and meaning of martial law were deeply contested before, during, and after the
period in question is important—as this recognition helps to make clear that
‘martial law’ is better understood as a collection of concerns and potentials, rather
than as a clear, unified concept. In particular, it is worth separating out five
different understandings and components of martial law. First, martial law may
refer to direct governance by the military. Second, martial law often involves the
displacement of the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts by special courts, typically
military tribunals, which employ procedures that accord less respect to due
process. Third, martial law allows for more assertive use of force. Fourth, martial
law allows for extended powers of search and detention, the seizure of property,
the compulsion of labor, and restrictions on freedom of movement such as
curfews. Fifth, martial law is generally closely linked to its purported purpose—
the protection of public safety and national security—which is considered to have
maximum force and thus trump all other concerns. It will be helpful to bear these
various affiliated features in mind as the following analysis proceeds, as by doing
so it will be possible to see the various ways in which, while some of the more
overt features of emergency or martial law were gradually replaced by more
legalized approaches, other features of emergency and martial law became
embedded in new legal regimes.

A. Suppressing Popular Uprisings
Prior to the nineteenth century, Ireland was governed by a combination of
martial law and the use of more traditional tools of riot control, in particular the
1714 Riot Act, which was also the primary means of attempting to control unrest
in England. 21 While this bi-polar alternation between martial law and more
account, one later endorsed by the Lord Chief Justice of England, martial law was the temporary
displacement of civilian rule by ‘military law’ . . . according to yet another and radically different
account of the term, martial law was nothing more than an exotic instance of the common law
defence of public necessity . . . In October 1865, the law of martial law was dauntingly complex,
perhaps utterly incoherent. But these difficulties did not make it any less pertinent.”); id. at Chapter
4; JOHN COLLINS, MARTIAL LAW AND ENGLISH LAWS, C. 1500–C. 1700 (2016) (emphasizing that
martial law should be understood as a form of law, with its own traditions and points of substantive
and procedural emphasis, rather than simply as the absence of law).
21

The full title of the Riot Act was “an act for preventing tumults and riotous assemblies, and for the
more speedy and effectual punishing the rioters.” Riot Act 1714, 1 Geo. St. 2 c.5 (Eng.). The Riot
Act allowed for a justice of the peace (as well as other specifically enumerated law enforcement
officials) to approach a crowd of “twelve or more, being unlawfully, riotously, and tumultuously
assembled together, to the disturbance of the public[] peace” (tumultuous assembly, flexibly, was
defined as a disturbance leading to the alarm of “someone of reasonable courage and firmness”),
and from “among the said rioters, or as near to them as he can safely come, [to] with a loud voice
command” a proclamation calling on the rioters “to disperse themselves, and peaceably to depart
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traditional mechanisms of control would continue from the eighteenth century
into the nineteenth century, the British increasingly experimented with new modes
of specially crafted repressive legislation to restrict and silence protest.
An early progenitor of this new approach came with a series of acts known
as the Whiteboy Acts. These acts targeted an Irish agrarian organization—known
as the whiteboys—that defended tenants’ rights through nightly raids and the
leveling of fences. The most significant Whiteboy Acts were the 1775 Tumultuous
Risings Act 22 and the 1787 Riot Act. 23 Among other things, the Tumultuous
Risings Act stipulated that those “ris[ing], assembl[ing], or appear[ing] . . . to the
terror of his Majesty’s subjects” while armed, or disguised “in any manner
whatsoever”, or “wearing any particular badge, dress, or uniform not usually worn
by him, her, or them upon … lawful occasions,” would be guilty of a high
misdemeanor. Those “knowingly excit[ing], encourag[ing], or promot[ing] . . .
unlawful meetings . . . by sound of drum, horn, musick, fire, shoutings, or other
signal” would similarly be found to have committed a high misdemeanor. 24 The
act also allowed magistrates to order searches of the houses of Catholics on
reasonable suspicion of the presence of arms, and to compel persons to appear
before them to provide evidence. The 1787 Riot Act, meanwhile, penalized those
administering and taking illegal oaths, and authorized capital punishment for those
engaged in seizing arms, forcing contributions to their cause by force or
intimidation, or publishing notices tending to produce riots or “unlawful
combinations.” 25
The next round of tensions was linked to the rising revolutionary tide.
Inspired by the French Revolution, the Society of United Irishmen was formed in
1791 with the twin aims of expanding the franchise and ending religious
discrimination. 26 The group was banned by the 1793 Convention Act, after war
was declared between France and Britain. 27 The Convention Act observed that
“assemblies, purporting to represent the People … may be made use of to serve

22
23
24

to their habitations, or to their lawful business.” Should the crowd fail to disperse after one hour,
those remaining would be “be adjudged [guilty of] felony without benefit of clergy,” with “the
offenders therein … adjudged felons” who would “suffer death as in a case of felony, without
benefit of clergy.”
Tumultuous Risings Act 1775, 15 & 16 Geo. 3 c. 21 (Ir.).
Riot Act 1787, 27 Geo. 3 c. 15 (Ir.).
See 15 & 16 Geo. 3 c. 21, at §§ 2, 23 (Ir.).

25

See WILLIAM LECKY, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY VOL. 6 408–09
(1887). The Act also introduced the English Riot Act into Ireland.

26

See SEAN CONNOLLY, DIVIDED KINGDOM: IRELAND 1630–1800, 434–42 (2008).
The full title of the law was “An Act to Prevent the Election or Appointment of unlawful
Assemblies, under Pretence of preparing or presenting public Petitions, or other Addresses to His
Majesty or the Parliament.” Convention Act 1793, 33 Geo. 3 c. 29 (Ir.).

27
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the Ends of factious and seditious Persons, to the violation of the public peace,
and the great and manifest Encouragement of riot, tumult, and disorder,” and
therefore declared such assemblies unlawful and required their dispersal and the
apprehension of any persons resisting dispersal. 28 In addition, the law stipulated
that anyone publishing or distributing a notice pertaining to the appointment of
persons to be representatives of such assemblies, or attending or voting for the
representatives of such an assembly, would be guilty of a “high Misdemeanor.” 29
The outlawing of the United Irishmen only served to further radicalize them,
leading the United Irishmen to forge links with the Defenders, a more overly
militant organization formed in 1792, and to begin preparations for direct military
confrontation. 30 In the face of this intensified opposition, the authorities passed
the Insurrection Act in 1796. 31 The act imposed the death penalty on persons
administering illegal oaths, and allowed the authorities to proclaim states of

28

29

30

31

THE HISTORY OF IRELAND: FROM THE TREATY OF LIMERICK TO THE PRESENT TIME: BEING A
CONTINUATION OF THE HISTORY OF THE ABBÉ MACGEOGHEGAN 372 (John Mitchel ed., 1869).
The final clause of the Convention Act 1793 stipulated that it should not “be construed in any
Manner as to prevent or impede the undoubted Right of His Majesty’s Subjects … to Petition His
Majesty, or both Houses … for Redress of any public or private Grievance”—a clause existing in
a degree of tension with the previous text. See 33 Geo. 3 c. 29 (Ir.), supra note 27. This act would be
exported back to Britain in 1799, in the form of the “Act for the more effectual Suppression of
Societies established for Seditious and Treasonable Purposes; and for better preventing Treasonable
and Seditious Practices,” known as the “Unlawful Societies” or the “Combination and
Confederacy” Act. 1799, 39 Geo. 3 c. 79 (Eng.). That act specifically “suppressed and prohibited”
the United Irishmen by name, as well as the United Scotsmen, the United Britons, the United
Englishmen, the London Corresponding Society, and all other “Corresponding Societies,” as well
as other societies involving unlawful oaths or secret membership. In addition, the 1799 Unlawful
Societies Act required that those places “used for delivering Lectures or Discourses, and holding
Debates … of a seditious and immoral Nature; and other Places [that] have of late been used for
seditious and immoral Purposes, under the Pretence of being Places of Meeting for the Purpose of
reading Books, Pamphlets, Newspapers, or other Publications,” as well as every “House, Room,
Field, or other Place, at or in which any Lecture or Discourse shall be publickly delivered … for the
Purpose of raising or collecting Money” should be “deemed a disorderly House or Place,” with all
those involved subject to fines, while a system of licensing was set up in order to render lectures or
readings lawful. The law also required printers to give notice to the authorities both of their work
as a printer in general and of any new paper they were printing, as well as to print their name and
abode on any publication, on penalty of fine (newspaper were exempted, however, as they were
already governed by a separate legal regime).
The militants were, moreover, supported by the French, who went so far as sending a force of
soldiers to assist the Irish rebellion in December 1796, following a plea from Wolfe Tone, the leader
of the United Irishmen; the force was put off from landing by storms, however. For more, see
DIVIDED KINGDOM: IRELAND, supra note 26.
The Insurrection Act 1796, 36 Geo. 3 c. 20 (Ir.). 1796 also saw passage of an Indemnity Act,
designed to protect those magistrates who suppressed the insurgents from any later lawsuits.
Indemnity Act 1796, 36 Geo. 3 c. 57 (Ir.).
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disturbance in certain districts, allowing for curfews, suspension of trial by jury,
and expanded powers of search and detention. 32
Despite the Insurrection Act, open conflict broke out in the form of the
United Irishmen Rebellion in 1798. The authorities responded by passing the
Suppression of Rebellion Act, authorizing trials by court martial, and imposing
martial law. 33 With the help of such measures, together with a campaign of
executions, torture, transportation, and collective punishment, the British were
able to put down the rebellion. 34
In many ways, the various laws of the period appeared to be an application
of emergency rule under another name. In particular, such features as the
authorization of searches and detentions, the potential for curfews, the potential
to compel persons to appear to provide evidence and to suspend jury trials, and
the application of capital punishment (including in cases of relatively moderate
behavior, such as administering oaths or publishing prohibited notices) all carried
a strong hint of legalized martial law. The Suppression of Rebellion Act was the
most unambiguous direct authorization of martial law.
At the same time, while such measures may have represented martial law in
slightly more legal form, the adoption of that form was significant. In addition,
the laws in question went beyond simply authorizing martial law-reminiscent
approaches by developing new concerns and targeting new forms of activity. In
particular, the Tumultuous Rising Act, the Irish Riot Act, and the Convention Act
experimented with the targeting of a wide variety of new subjects—those “rising,”
“assembling” or “appearing” to “the terror of his Majesty’s subject”; those
“exciting,” “encouraging” or “promoting” “unlawful meetings”; and those
administering “unlawful oaths” or publishing “notices” tending to produce
“unlawful combinations.” 35 This expansive, experimental language—not
32

33

34

See 36 Geo. 3 c. 20 (Ir.). The Insurrection Act 1796 was in force until 1802, after which it was
resurrected from 1807–1810, from 1814–1818, and again from 1822–1825. From its first
resurrection in 1807, however, the penalty of death for administering illegal oaths was downgraded
to a penalty of transportation for life.
Suppression of Rebellion Act 1799, 39 Geo. 3 c. 11 (Ir.). Among later acts inspired by the law was
the 1863 Suppression of Rebellion Act in New Zealand, which targeted the Maori people.
Both martial law and the Suppression Act were extended until 1805. For more on the repressive
legislation of the period, see CHARLES TOWNSHEND, POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN IRELAND:
GOVERNMENT AND RESISTANCE SINCE 1848 55–6 (1983).
Despite the generally repressive climate, a couple positive precedents were formed in the courts. In
Wright v. Fitzgerald 769, 815, 818–20 (1798) 27 St. Tr. 759, the plaintiff succeeded in a tort action
against defendant sheriff, who had ordered the plaintiff flogged while martial law was in place, with
the court finding that martial law does not allow for arbitrary and cruel punishment. Wolfe Tone’s
Case 625–26 (1798) 27 St. Tr. 614, meanwhile ruled that a civilian could not be tried before a military
court while civilian courts were operating.

35

See 15 & 16 Geo. 3 c. 21 (Ir.), supra note 22; 27 Geo. 3 c. 15 (Ir.), supra note 22; 33 Geo. 3 c. 29 (Ir.)
supra note 27.
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uncommon for lawyers who are cautious to prevent loopholes—was, despite its
diversity, clearly aimed at a central concern. In particular, all these new
penalizations were targeted at various ways in which people might gather or come
together, be it in the form of an assembly (or “rising” or “appearance”), a meeting,
or a more hidden (and hence more frightening) society formed by the swearing of
oaths. If the suppression of what the British themselves managed to aptly term in
the aggregate as “unlawful combinations”—including, and perhaps especially, as
the Convention Act made clear, those aimed at achieving political change in the
name of the people—could be accomplished by law, perhaps a more overt, and
hence provocative, form of martial law would become unnecessary.

B. Preserving the Peace
The unrest of the turn of the century was ultimately suppressed by these new
legal tools. However, rural violence, disorder, and resistance increased again in the
early 1810s, in part enabled by the diminished strength of local military forces as
a result of redeployment to the war with France. 36 The period also saw the
formation and growth of several secret associations, most notably the Ribbonmen,
consisting mostly of poor Catholics, who directed their attacks against landlords
and tithe servers and grew noticeably in strength. 37
The British responded with the first Peace Preservation Act, 38 which was
pushed forward by Robert Peel, Chief Secretary of Ireland, and passed into law in
1814. 39 The Act declared in its preamble that it was targeted against
“disturbances,” and allowed for the Lord Lieutenant or other Chief Governors of
Ireland to declare particular regions to be in “a State of Disturbance” (as well as
36

37
38

39

Unrest was often the product of a shortage of food, leading to numerous “food riots,” which the
police and military were called upon to suppress. See JAMES KELLY, FOOD RIOTING IN IRELAND IN
THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES: THE ‘MORAL ECONOMY’ AND THE IRISH CROWD
172 (2017). The rural unrest was attributed by the British to “banditti armies,” an early instance of
what would become a regular trope on the part of the British, and others, to describe those who
resisted their rule as “bandits” or the like. See Galen Broeker, Robert Peel and the Peace Preservation
Force, 33 J. MOD. HIST. 363, 364 (1961). As Peel would put it, the bill in general aimed to help the
“better class” of people to become free from fear and to assert their authority over the “worse
classes.” Quoted in id. at 368. For similar later attempts to tar the Ribbonmen as bandits, see Jess
Lumsden Fisher, ‘Night Marauders’ and ‘Deluded Wretches’: Public Discourses on Ribbonism in Pre-Famine
Ireland, in CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND THE IRISH IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (Kyle Hughes &
Donald M. MacRaild eds., 2017).
See FISHER, supra note 35.
Peace Preservation Act 1814, 54 Geo. 3 c. 131 (Eng.) (in full, “An act to provide for the better
execution of the Laws of Ireland, by appointing Superintending Magistrates and additional
Constables in Counties in certain cases”).
On the passage of the act, see Kyle Hughes & Donald M. MacRail, Introduction: Crime, Violence, and
the Irish in the Nineteenth Century; Themes and Perspectives, in CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND THE IRISH IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY (Kyle Hughes & Donald M. MacRaild eds., 2017).
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to declare when such a district might be “restated to Peace and good Order”),
whereupon they would be enabled to appoint magistrates and constables to
oversee, police, and attempt to end such disturbances. 40 The Act also enabled the
creation of a new force of constables, known as the Peace Preservation Force, 41
as well as a new set of superintending magistrates 42 to support the act’s broader
aims. The new force would operate from 1814 until 1822, when they were replaced
by a national constabulary. 43

40

41

42

43

The costs of managing such disturbances would be borne by the local district in question. This
payment structure was consciously designed by Peel to pressure those locals who would bear the
cost onto the government’s side relative to the forces of local unrest. See Broeker, supra note 35, at
366.
The first formal police force in the British Isles had also been set up in Ireland, by the Dublin Police
Act 1786, 26 Geo. 3 c. 24 (Ir.)—shortly after similar proposals were rejected in London. For more,
see Stanley Palmer, The Irish Police Experiment: The Beginnings of Modern Police in the British Isles, 178595, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE HISTORY: THEMES AND CONTROVERSIES FROM PRE-INDEPENDENCE
IRELAND (Ian O’Donnell & Finbarr McAuley eds., 2003). The 1786 act put the Dublin force under
the overall control of three magistrates, termed “Commissioners of Police,” and the operational
control of a high constable. See JIM HERLIHY, THE ROYAL IRISH CONSTABULARY: A SHORT HISTORY
AND GENEALOGICAL GUIDE WITH A SELECT LIST OF MEDICAL AWARDS AND CASUALTIES 36 (2nd
ed., 2016). The Irish police system was modeled in turn on a similar system that had been put in
place in Scotland in 1714. See id. The Irish police force was bitterly opposed by the Patriotic Party,
which stood for strong Irish self-government within the Empire; thus, for instance, the leader of
the Patriotic Party, Henry Grattan, argued “If ever a city entertained an odium capable of being
ascertained by numerical calculation, the city of Dublin entertained such a hatred for this institution
… No measures, no expense, no enormity of administration had ever excited discontent so strong
as this abominable establishment.” Quoted in id. at 38.
See 54 Geo. 3 c. 131 (Eng.). These new magistrates would include “resident” magistrates, so known
because they were required to reside in the districts to which they were assigned, as well as and
“stipendiary” magistrates, so known because they were paid for their services (in contrast to
traditional magistrates). Many resident magistrates were former British army officers with little legal
training. See Broeker, supra note 36, at 366. The act’s combination of a new police force with a new
magistrate service would become a powerful model; as Vogler notes, “the amalgamation of police
and magisterial functions within a single hierarchy became a common feature of British colonial
practice.” RICHARD VOGLER, READING THE RIOT ACT: THE MAGISTRACY, THE POLICE AND THE
ARMY IN CIVIL DISORDER 19 (1991).
The Constabulary Act of 1822, 3 Geo. 4 c. 103 (Eng.), established the new police force. For more,
see JAMES DONNELLY, JR., CAPTAIN ROCK: THE IRISH AGRARIAN REBELLION OF 1821–1824 302 n.
53 (2009). Amongst other interesting features, this new force was oddly outfitted, some in “blue
jackets with silk cord, red cuffs and collars and gold lace girdle, a tall beaver hat with feathers and
[with] a long scarlet cloak over their horses’ tails,” some in “hussar fashion,” and some
“resemble[ing] dragoons.” In short, the new police force were outfitted in a variety of cast-off,
obselete military garb. HERLIHY, supra note 41, at 42, 44. Relative to the new Irish police, Walter
Scott in 1825 observed “The public peace is secured chiefly by large bodies of armed police, called
by the civil term of constables, but very unlike the Dogberries of Old England, being, in fact,
soldiers on foot and horse, well-armed and mounted, and dressed like our yeomen. It is not pleasant
to see this, but it is absolutely necessary for some time at least.” Quoted in id. at 52.
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The Peace Preservation Act was already noteworthy for its name alone—a
potent rebranding of the light martial law it imposed as the “preservation” of
“peace.” In substance, it combined the legalized, localized potential to escalate the
level of coercion in particular districts already seen in the Insurrection Act with
the creation of two key institutional structures designed to enforce the order
sought. Those structures—the Peace Preservation Force and the new resident
stipendiary magistrates—also combined elements of exceptional and everyday
legality because the Peace Preservation Force consisted of neither pure soldiers
nor unarmed local watchmen, while the stipendiary magistrates were neither fully
traditional judicial authorities nor martial law adjudicators.

C. Clamping Down on Unlawful Societies
The Irish Agrarian Rebellion, which began in 1821, 44 led to passage of the
1822 Insurrection Act, 45 followed by the 1823 Unlawful Oaths Act. 46 The 1822
Insurrection Act introduced a curfew as well as summary justice procedures. The
1823 Unlawful Oaths Act declared “any and every society, association,
brotherhood, committee, lodge, club, or confederacy whatsoever, now established
or hereafter to be established in Ireland,” which utilized ‘oaths’ or other such
‘engagements,’ ‘tests,’ or ‘declarations,’ or which operated with a degree of secrecy,
and which were not lawfully registered, to be “unlawful combinations.”
A final coda to this succession of laws was provided by the Unlawful
Societies Suppression Act of 1825. 47 The act declared the following unlawful:
[Any] Society, Committee, or Body of Persons . . . in Ireland . . . exercising
the Power of acting for the Purpose or under the Pretence of procuring the
Redress of Grievances . . . or the Alteration of any Matters by Law established
in Church or State, or for the Purpose of under the Pretence of carrying on
or assisting in the Prosecution or Defence of Causes. 48

The act also outlawed any societies “from which Persons of any Form of Religious
Faith allowed or tolerated by Law shall be excluded” or which required their
member to take an oath. 49
These new laws largely continued down lines already marked. The 1822
Insurrection Act, like its predecessor, instituted several measures closely
associated with martial law, while nonetheless stopping short of declaring martial
44

For more, see DONNELLY, supra note 43.

45

Insurrection Act 1822, 3 Geo. 4 c. 1 (Eng.). The Insurrection Act was accompanied by a Habeas
Corpus Suspension Act 1822, 3 Geo. 4 c. 2 (Eng.).

46

Unlawful Oaths Act 1823, 4 Geo. 4 c. 87 (Eng.).
Unlawful Societies Suppression Act 1825, 6 Geo. 4 c. 4 (Eng.).

47
48
49

See id.
Id.
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law as such. The Unlawful Oaths Act and the Unlawful Societies Suppression Act
meanwhile picked up the previous concern with “unlawful combinations,” while
focusing less on the possibility of assembly and more on the association side of
the equation. As with the earlier Convention Act, the new Unlawful Societies
Suppression Act was, moreover, very blunt about its overt aim of suppressing
what might otherwise seem the quite reasonable aim of “procuring the redress of
grievances.” 50 The laws of this period were nonetheless notable in that they were
now largely divorced from the more overtly martial law components of the turn
of the century—one more move towards the regularization of the new mode of
repressive legal governance.

D. Suppressing Tumultuous Disturbances
The following years saw a series of major marches and demonstrations in
both the Catholic and Protestant communities, which increased tensions. After
more serious violence was narrowly avoided near Ballybay between the
Orangemen 51 and members of a Catholic emancipation march, local magistrates
instituted a ban on assemblies, while the Lord Lieutenant declared such meetings
illegal across Ireland on the grounds that they threatened the public peace. 52 The
governing authorities put off further repressive legislative action, and instead
passed the Catholic Emancipation Act in 1829 53 to remove the prohibition on
Catholics serving in parliament in an effort to reduce Catholic protests.
While Catholic protests may in fact have diminished, the Orangemen,
encouraged by their perceived victory at Ballybay, began to march and hold
demonstrations with greater intensity. Around the same time, tensions around the
country were heating up due to resentment towards the system whereby all
Irishmen, regardless of religion, were forced to pay tithes for the upkeep of the
official (Protestant) Church of Ireland, leading to a period of unrest known as the
“Tithe War.” 54

50

Id.

51

The Orangemen were a militant Irish Protestant order founded in 1795. For more, see COLONEL
WILLIAM BLACKER & COLONEL ROBERT HUGH WALLACE, THE FORMATION OF THE ORANGE
ORDER 1795–1798 (Cecil Kilpatrick ed., 1994); Jim Smyth, The Men of No Popery: The Origins of the
Orange Order, 3 HIST. IR. 48 (1995); D.W. Miller, The Origins of the Orange Order in County Armagh, in
ARMAGH: HISTORY AND SOCIETY (A.J. Hughes & William Nolan eds., 2001).
See Neil Maddox, “A Melancholy Record”: The Story of the Nineteenth-Century Irish Party Processions Acts,
39 IRISH JURIST N.S. 243, 248 (2004).
Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829, 10 Geo. 4 c. 7 (Eng.).

52

53
54

See DAVID GEORGE BOYCE, NINETEENTH CENTURY IRELAND: THE SEARCH FOR STABILITY 62–64
(1990).
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The British responded with new legislation. In 1831 the Tumultuous Risings
(Ireland) Act was passed. 55 The Act gave the government several additional
powers. Most notably, the Act imposed punishments on those “rising and
assembling” and “unlawfully compel[ling]” persons to quit their dwellings, or
breaking into such dwellings, or maliciously “injuring” or damaging property. The
Act also imposed punishments on
any Person or Persons [who should] knowingly print, write, post, publish,
circulate, send, or deliver, or cause or procure to be printed, written, posted,
published, circulated, sent, or delivered, any Notice, Letter, or Message
exciting or tending to excite any Riot, tumultuous or unlawful Meeting or
Assembly, or unlawful Combination or Confederacy. 56

Those who should “assist, abet, or succor . . . or shall knowingly excite, encourage,
or promote, or shall solicit, ask, or require . . . or shall endeavour to compel or
induce any Person or Persons, to join in the Commission of any” of these offences
were also punished. 57 The Tumultuous Risings (Ireland) Act also allowed the
authorities to fine uncooperative witnesses.
In 1832, this legislation was complemented by passage of the Party
Processions Act. 58 The Party Processions Act was most notable for its prohibition
of “Banner[s], Emblem[s], Flag[s] or Symbol[s] . . . or . . . Music” calculated or
tending to “provoke Animosity between His Majesty’s Subjects of different
religious Persuasions.” 59 The standard of “calculation” or “tendency to provoke”
was noteworthy because it in effect created a standard based on the effects of
owning or displaying such accoutrements rather than the intent of the person. As
Maddox notes, this “represented a major inroad on the common law right of
procession” and was interpreted at the time as an absolute ban. 60
In 1833 the Party Processions Act was followed by the Suppression of
Disturbances Act. 61 The Act allowed the Lord Lieutenant to prohibit meetings he
deemed dangerous to the public safety. The Act also made secret calls for any
assemblies a misdemeanor, and required the owners of houses to present lists of
all adult males residing therein to the authorities. The Lord Lieutenant was also
55

Tumultuous Risings (Ireland) Act 1831, 1 & 2 Will. 4 c. 44 (Eng.). Officially, the Act was an
amendment of the 1775 Tumultuous Risings Act, and hence like that act was also referred to as a
‘whiteboy’ act.

56

See id. at § 3.
Id. at § 6.

57
58
59
60
61

Party Processions Act 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4 c. 118 (Eng.).
Id.
Maddox, supra note 52, at 250.
Suppression of Disturbances Act 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4 c. 40 (Eng.). Officially “An Act for the More
Effectual Suppression of Local Disturbances and Dangerous Associations in Ireland.” Also known
as the “Insurrection Act” as well as the “Coercion Act.”
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empowered to proclaim counties disturbed, wherein no meetings for the purposes
of petitioning Parliament would be allowed without prior authorization, and
persons out after sunset would be guilty of a misdemeanor. 62 Perhaps the most
notorious measure of the law was its allowance of court martial proceedings in
proclaimed districts; amongst other powers, the court martial magistrates were
given the power to compel the attendance of witnesses. 63
Capping off these repressive measures was the establishment of the Irish
Constabulary in 1836, 64 providing Ireland with a strongly centralized, armed police
force (which would serve as a key model, as well as a source of trainers and
personnel, for other police forces throughout the Empire in the years to come). 65
Echoing earlier legislation, the 1836 bill allowed for the deployment of increased
numbers of police to troubled districts, normalizing a rule previously developed
for emergency situations. The act also regularized the system of resident
stipendiary magistrates, who would play an increasingly significant role in the
delivery of local justice over time.
Like earlier measures, the 1833 Suppression of Disturbances Act66 straddled
the line between martial law and a more regular legality. At the same time, it went
further in the latter direction than previous measures. In particular, the act focused
specifically on assemblies and employed a regulatory approach in its emphasis on
the production of lists of inhabitants, which was made possible by its relatively
light penalties. Indeed, in shaping the applicable legal regime around the
anticipatory issues of prohibitions on certain assemblies and the requirement of
prior authorization, and by moving away from simply applying harsh penalties and

62

63

64

65

66

However, those abroad at night might escape penalty if they could demonstrate a lawful purpose.
See id. at Art. 22.
See 3 & 4 Will. 4 c. 40 (Eng.), supra note 61. As Townshend observes, the object of allowing for
court martial proceedings was “to provide courts which would be proof against intimidation, and
herein lay its proximity to outright martial law. It was an admission that the normal legal process
has broken down, or perhaps one should rather say had become paralysed.” TOWNSHEND, supra
note 34, at 57. It is also worth noting that article 7 of Suppression of Disturbances Act 1833 required
local authorities to take measures to suppress insurrection and bring offenders to trial—highlighting
the fact that the aim of the authorities in passing such legislation was in part to attempt to motivate
local authorities to more rigorous action.
Constabulary (Ireland) (No. 2) Act 1836, 6 & 7 Will. 4 c. 36 (Eng.). In addition to the new
constabulary, a ‘Revenue Police’ had been established four years previously, by the 1831 the Illicit
Distillation (Ireland) Act (1 & 2 Will. 4 c. 55) (which also consolidated the previous legal framework
suppressing the illicit distillation of spirits). See HERLIHY, supra note 41, at 45.
Id. For more, see TOWNSHEND, supra note 34, at 67–68; Henry A. Blake, The Irish Police, in THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 386–87 (James Knowles ed., vol. 9, 1881); Richard Hawkins, The ‘Irish
Model’ and the Empire: A Case for Reassessment, in POLICING THE EMPIRE: GOVERNMENT, AUTHORITY
AND CONTROL, 1830–1940 25 (David Anderson & David Killingray eds., 1991).
See Suppression of Disturbances Act, 3 & 4 Will. 4 c. 40 (Eng.), supra note 61.
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authorizing forceful dispersal as a reactive measure, the act presaged much of
contemporary repressive assembly governance.
The 1831 Tumultuous Risings (Ireland) Act was similarly focused on
assemblies. Its major innovation was to broaden the scope of the activity it
targeted, by seeking to punish anyone in one way or another helping to “excite”
such riots, as well as anyone assisting them. While the language of the statute
required that such excitement or assistance be knowing, the breadth of the rest of
the language, and of the manners in which such excitement or assistance might be
provided, gave the statute very broad reach. The 1832 Party Processions Act went
further down this same road, by explicitly targeting anyone whose use of banners,
emblems, flags, symbols, or music provoked animosity between religious
communities, regardless of their subjective intent. 67
Finally, the 1836 Constabulary (Ireland) Act made permanent the
innovations of 1814, which provided the new legal approaches of the period with
the institutional tools necessary for their enforcement. 68 The quasi-military police
model of what would come to be known as the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC)
that was thereby regularized in Ireland would become infamous. It would provide
the wellspring of a British approach to colonial policing that would be exported
around the world over the course of the following 125 years. That new force was
all the more empowered thanks to their links to the new resident magistrate
system, underscoring the one-sided nature of the legal system being constructed.

E. Combatting Crimes and Outrages
The outbreak of the Irish famine in 1845 stoked British fears of another Irish
rebellion. In response, a group of Irish magistrates called for emergency powers
to be granted to the Lord Lieutenant, writing
we wish to impress upon Her Majesty's Government the absolute necessity
of placing in the hands of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland such powers as may
enable His Excellency to proclaim districts where savage acts are perpetrated,
as it is quite manifest that the common law of the land is not sufficiently
stringent to subdue the combination that has so long prevailed and which so
67

In addition to the resonances of the Party Processions Act explored below, the Act was almost
immediately emulated in Canada; for more, see Annie Tock Morrisette, Preventing the Parade: The
Party Processions Acts in Ireland and Canada, 48 AM. REV. CAN. STUD. 110 (2018).

68

As McMahon notes,
Over the course of the first fifty years of the nineteenth century the role and
position of the police [in Ireland] were to change almost beyond recognition—
moving from an essentially local force, made up of semi-professional baronial
constables, to a centrally controlled and armed one consisting of over 11,000
men by the late 1840s.
Richard McMahon, A Violent Society? Homicide Rates in Ireland, 1831–1850, 36 IRISH ECON. & SOC.
HIST. 1, 4 (2009).
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constantly prevents the possibility of detecting and convicting the base
miscreants who are guilty of crimes more atrocious than are to be heard of in
the most uncivilised parts of the world. 69

Their plea was answered with the Crime and Outrage (Ireland) Act of 1847. 70
The Act followed the 1814 model, providing the Lord Lieutenant the ability to
organize the island into districts and to bring extra police into those districts, at
local expense, when he deemed that such was necessary “for the Prevention of
Crime and Outrage.” The Act also took several further steps: it limited the ability
of those within the districts in question to carry arms in public, and allowed the
authorities to require that persons surrender any arms they owned; it authorized
individual searches of those suspected of carrying arms, as well as district-wide
searches; and, most coercive of all, it allowed the local authorities to require men
between the ages of sixteen and sixty to assist them in apprehending murder
suspects in proclaimed districts. 71
The government had allowed the 1832 Party Processions Act to lapse in
1844, in large part in recognition of the effective efforts of the Repeal Union to
police and control their own assemblies. Following clashes between Ribbonmen
and Orangemen at the 1849 Battle of Dolly’s Brae, in which some thirty people
were killed, the British introduced a new Party Processions Act drafted in similar
terms to the previous act. 72
In general, both the 1847 Crime and Outrage Act and the new 1850 Party
Processions Act manifested the repressive approach to public order legality
already established. The 1847 Crime and Outrage Act was notable for its shift in
69

70

71

72

TOWNSHEND, supra note 34, at 55 (citing Letter from Roscommon Co. Tipperary magistrates to
Earl of Clarendon (Nov. 1847), in PRO HO 45 1793).
Crime and Outrage (Ireland) Act 1847, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 2 (Eng.). It is officially “An Act for the
better Prevention of Crime and Outrage in certain Parts of Ireland.” The Act was introduced into
Parliament with a reading of a royal speech, which declared that “Her Majesty laments that in some
Counties of Ireland atrocious Crimes have been committed, and a Spirit of Insubordination has
manifested itself, leading to an Organised Resistance to legal Rights,” events which led her majesty
to the sentiment that it was “her Duty to her peaceable and well-disposed Subjects to ask the
Assistance of Parliament in taking further Precautions against the Perpetration of Crime in certain
Counties and Districts in Ireland.” 95 Parl Deb HC (3d ser.) (1847) cols. 270–366 (Eng.). The Act’s
general conception as one of ‘peace preservation’ was made clear in 1856, when an act was passed
under the title of the Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act 1856, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 36 (Eng.), which had
the function of extending the operation of the 1847 act, while also making a few amendments,
including reducing the length of certain punishments.
See 11 & 12 Vict. c. 2 (Eng.), at §§ X-XVI. The Crime and Outrage (Ireland) Act also stipulated that
the 1775 Tumultuous Risings Act, as amended by the 1831 Tumultuous Risings (Ireland) Act, would
apply in any proclaimed district.
Party Processions Act 1850, 13 & 14 Vict. c. 2 (Eng.). After clashes in Derrymacash and at the
Fermanagh assizes in 1860 the Act would be supplemented by the Party Emblems Act, which made
the display of party emblems and the playing of party tunes illegal. For more, see Maddox, supra
note 52, at 256–58 (2004).
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the frame through which it addressed the harms in question, preferring to label
them “crimes” or “outrages,” rather than treason or sedition. 73 This shift in
framing suggested opposition to British rule should be understood as an offense
against the broader public in Ireland, rather than simply as resistance to the British
crown. This rhetorical shift, aimed at garnering wider public support for British
imperial rule and at delegitimizing resistance thereto, would continue to develop
in the years to come.

F. A Return to Outright Suppression
A new insurgent political movement, known as the Fenian movement, was
founded in 1858. Tensions between the Fenians and the authorities increased
rapidly over the following decade. In September 1865, the offices of the Irish
People, the chief Fenian paper, were raided, after which the paper was suppressed;
around the same time, multiple Fenian leaders were arrested and jailed. 74 Habeas
corpus was suspended in February of 1866, and over a thousand more suspected
Fenians were arrested in the months that followed. 75 In addition, in 1866, the
government started deploying commissioners of the peace alongside the military
in Cork, who were to “act as Magistrates with the Troops on any emergency when
it may not be practicable to obtain the services of one of the ordinary
magistrates.” 76 This deployment may have incorporated a certain check on the
troops’ actions, but more forcefully suggested that the ultimate aim of having
magistrates, or commissioners of the peace, was simply to cast a veil of legitimacy
over such deployments of force as the military deemed necessary.
An attempted Fenian revolt in February and March of 1867 was quickly
suppressed by the government. Much of the government campaign was led by Sir
Hugh Rose, who was known for successfully defeating the “Indian Mutiny” nine
years earlier. Rose adopted a series of aggressive tactics, including the use of
“flying columns,” quick deployments of small military contingents to far-flung
areas. 77 Rose considered the flying columns a great success, praising the manner
in which their heightened powers of search and arrest in particular “overawed the

73

See generally 11 & 12 Vict. c. 2 (Eng.).

74

See Kerby Miller & Breandán Mac Suibhne, Frank Roney and the Fenians: A Reappraisal of Irish
Republicanism in 1860s Belfast and Ulster, 51 ÉIRE-IRELAND 23, 29 (2016).

75

See id.
Letter from Chief Secretary to Commander in Chief, (Dec. 7, 1866), quoted in TOWNSHEND, supra
note 34, at 91; see also & Letters from Under-Secretary to Major-General Bates, OC Cork Division
(Dec. 5 and 11, 1866).

76

77

See TOWNSHEND, supra note 34, at 94.
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disaffected.” 78 In addition, Rose freely authorized the use of court martials to
sentence suspected insurgents. 79 While the atmosphere would remain tense for
several years after 1867, 80 the authorities’ use of heavy-handed tactics was
ultimately effective, at least in the short term.

G. Protecting Life and Property
In 1870, another peace preservation act was passed, 81 which continued and
further developed the peace preservation tradition. Perhaps most significantly, the
Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act 1870 allowed for summary proceedings to be
used in certain proclaimed areas, relative to a number of offenses defined under
the Act and its predecessors. 82 The Act also allowed magistrates to summon
persons believed to be capable of giving evidence, and to jail those who refuse to
show up or answer questions. In addition, the Act allowed for the arrest of “any
stranger sojourning or wandering in any district specially proclaimed” as well as
of any person found outside their dwelling during the night, and not “upon some
lawful occasion or business.” 83
Even more innovatively, the Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act 1870 also
marked a new point of departure by providing for novel forms of control over the
press. The Act allowed the Lord Lieutenant to halt publication of a paper where
he determined that it contained “any treasonable or seditious engraving, matter,
or expressions, or any incitements to the commission of any felony, or any
engraving, matter, or expressions encouraging or propagating treason or sedition,
78

79
80

81
82
83

In particular, Rose observed:
Th[e] sudden appearance [of the flying columns] in different parts of the country
where Troops have rarely been seen; their patrols, by day and night, combined
so as to surprise and surround bad districts often in the worst possible weathers;
the search of houses, and arrest of suspected parties which the Police, without
their aid, had been unable to effect, have produced the best possible impression
in reassuring the loyal and overawing the disaffected.
TOWNSHEND, supra note 34, at 94 (quoting Letter from Commander in Chief to Secretary for War,
(Apr. 12, 1867), in Kilmainham MSS 1060).
See TOWNSHEND, supra note 34, at 89–90.
As Friedrich Engels would observe in a letter to Karl Marx, following his trip to Ireland in 1869,
The state of war is . . . noticeable everywhere. There are squads of Royal Irish
all over the place, with sheath-knives, and occasionally a revolver at their side
and a police baton in their hand; in Dublin a horse-drawn battery drove right
through the centre of town, a thing I have never seen in England, and there are
soldiers literally everywhere.
Letter from Friedrich Engels to Karl Marx (Sept. 27, 1869).
Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act 1870, 33 Vict. c. 9 (Eng.).
Id. at § 26.
Id. at §§ 23, 25.
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or inciting to the commission of a felony,” as well as to seize any paper circulated
in Ireland deemed to contain such content. 84 In addition, the Act allowed the
authorities to search printing houses and to seize printing presses as well as any
materials used for the suspected printing of treasonous or seditious materials. 85
These new provisions proved particularly potent as they penalized seditious
printing. The passage of the Act immediately led to the arrest of a printer who
sold an allegedly seditious pamphlet, titled the Farmers’ Catechism, in early
September 1870. 86
In the 1870s, habeas corpus was once again suspended and military patrols
were set up. The Protection of Life and Property Act 1871 was passed, which had
the purpose of:
empowering the Lord Lieutenant or other Chief . . . Governors of Ireland to
apprehend and detain for a limited time persons suspected of being members
of the Ribbon Society in the County of Westmeath, or in certain adjoining
portions of the County of Meath and the King’s County. 87

The Act allowed for arrest on reasonable suspicion, detention without trial, and
the suspension of recognizing habeas corpus claims. 88

84

Id. at § 30.

85

The Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act 1870 also imposed a modest limit on this power by allowing
tort suits to be brought where such seizure was deemed illegitimate. Id. at § 33.

86

The pamphlet in question critiqued the oppression of landlords, opining for instance that
I . . . believe that I do not enjoy the fruits of my labour, for I am compelled to
give it to men who reap where they do not sow, and gather where they have not
strewn, who are better known in the banqueting-hall, the foreign club-house, or
on the betting-field than in the school of industry or among their honest, careworn tenantry, save when the corn is ripe … [they] live in ease and indolence,
rolling about in purple and fine linen, and faring sumptuously every day on the
toil and sweat of their fellow-creatures, and reveling on the bread of idleness …
it is full time they should be brought to know and feel that the stalwart farmers
are the bone and sinew of the land, and that they will no longer endure or submit
to the burdens heaped on them by a class of extravagant landlords, who are the
chief cause of the grievances of this country. I believe in the fall of rents and
lowering of taxes, the suppression of crime, and the emancipation of all slaves.
The Peace Preservation Act in Ireland, TUAPEKA TIMES, Sept. 8, 1870, Vol. 3, Issue 135.

87

Protection of Life and Property Act 1871, 34 Vict. c. 25 (Eng.).
As Townshend has put it,
The reasoning behind the measure was that if a society was being terrorized, this
was due to the activity of terrorists; if this small group could be removed,
normality would reassert itself. This way of looking at the problem established
an important pattern, which has been well characterized by Patrick O’Farrell as
the English habit of ‘setting up a sharp division between the men of peace and
the men of violence’: it had the effect of ‘isolating, in English minds, the men
of violence from the real, majority Ireland, and of elevating violence and those
who used it into the entirety of the Irish problem.’
Townshend, supra note 34, at 63–64 (quoting PATRICK O’FARRELL, ENGLAND AND IRELAND 157
(1975)).
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The new legislation of this period indicated how far the authorities had
come. The Protection of Life and Property Act was yet another new form of
martial law-light, once again rebranded to attempt to legitimize the measures in
question. While the resuscitation of the peace preservation framework the year
before similarly recalled several features of martial law governance, the Peace
Preservation (Ireland) Act 1870, as shown above, went further than the Protection
of Life and Property Act in terms of incorporating repressive elements into a more
normalized frame. On the most general level, this Peace Preservation Act reached
this middle ground by simultaneously establishing a more regularized but also
exceptional arena of summary legal proceedings. In more particular terms, it did
so by accompanying one-sided measures with plausible yet hard to prove
defenses—allowing, for instance, persons found abroad at night to escape
detention should they be able to demonstrate that they were pursuing a lawful
purpose, a standard so vague as to grant the authorities a lot of discretion in
practice.
The restrictions on the press were similarly important, marking a new focus
by the authorities on the root causes of rather than the manifestations of
discontent. The broad discretion given to authorities to suppress publications
under the Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act 1870, as well as its forceful language,
testified to the importance the authorities placed on such publications—a
testimony further confirmed by the rapidity with which the authorities enforced
relevant components of the law.

H. Protecting Persons and Property
The 1870 Peace Preservation Act was allowed to lapse in 1875. 89 The effects
of a global depression that began in 1873, discussed further below, became
increasingly worse as the decade progressed, leading to tensions heating up and
sparking a “land war,” which was exacerbated by an agricultural crisis in 1878 and
89

As Winston Churchill would later put it,
[N]othing in the state of Ireland disclosed by every channel of official
information, either in regard to agrarian discontent or secret associations,
justified [the Peace Preservation Act of 1870] being allowed to lapse. The draft
of the Bill for its renewal . . . confronted the new Minister on his arrival at
[Dublin] Castle. Out of sixty-nine resident magistrate consulted, sixty-one had
declared the re-enactment indispensable and eleven of these had asked for
further powers . . . But . . . the Irish vote in the English boroughs [had recently
moved over] solidly on to the Liberal side. Many sympathetic speeches and
friendly offices had been exchanged between Liberal candidates and Irish
politicians, many lofty sentiments about the rights of nationalities had been
uttered, and all had proceeded together to the poll as the equal friends of
freedom. It would have been awkward after this . . . to inaugurate the new era
for Ireland by ‘exceptional legislation in abridgment of liberty.’
WINSTON CHURCHILL, LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL 139–180 (1906).
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1879. 90 A huge rally of tenant farmers took place in County Mayo in 1879 in
protest against agricultural tenant policy. The same year also saw the formation of
the Land League, which pushed for agricultural reforms. Landlords refused to
soften their position, continuing to evict tenants who could not pay their rents
while relying on the support of the army-backed RIC. However, even the presence
of such forces could not always protect the landlords. They could not avoid
sporadic attacks carried out by evictees and other disgruntled people who killed a
number of landlords, landlords’ agents, and policemen. 91
Against this background, the British once again suspended habeas corpus and
reinstated a new Peace Preservation Act92 as well as a “Protection of Persons and
Property” Act in 1881. 93 The new 1881 Peace Preservation Act was the most
abbreviated yet, simply prohibiting persons in proclaimed districts from having or
carrying arms. The Protection of Persons and Property Act meanwhile allowed
the Lord Lieutenant to issue warrants declaring persons guilty of “treason,
treason-felony . . . treasonable practices” or any other violent or intimidating
crime committed within a prescribed district, after which they might be arrested
and detained indefinitely as long as the law persisted. 94
It was not long before the new Protection of Persons and Property Act was
used to arrest and charge Charles Stewart Parnell, the most prominent Irish
nationalist politician, and several other leaders of the Land League, with
“treasonable practices” as well as to ban the Land League itself. 95 Parnell and his
lieutenants were sentenced to prison on October 13th, where they would remain
for almost seven months, before a change of heart in the British government
allowed for their release. 96

90

For more on land rights agitation in Ireland the 1870s and 80s, see F.S.L. LYONS, IRELAND SINCE
THE FAMINE 156–86 (1971); W.E. VAUGHAN, LANDLORDS AND TENANTS IN MID-VICTORIAN
IRELAND (1994).

91

For more on violence in the context of land struggles in Ireland in the period, see W.E. VAUGHAN,
LANDLORDS AND TENANTS IN MID-VICTORIAN IRELAND Chapter 6 (1994). The local community
employed tactics other than direct violence as well, including shunning or ostracizing landlords and
landlords’ agents. One of the people that this tactic was adopted and used against was Charles
Boycott, who thereby gained the dubious honor of lending his name to the tactic.
Peace Preservation Act 1881, 44 & 45 Vict. c. 5 (Eng.).

92
93
94
95

96

Protection of Persons and Property Act 1881, 44 & 45 Vict. c. 4 (Eng.).
See id. at § 1.
Key in this context were attacks on government policy made by the newly established newspaper
United Ireland, a paper with self-consciously radical aims, as indicated by its description by its editor,
William O’Brien, as “a weekly insurrection in print”. See WILLIAM O’BRIEN, EVENING MEMORIES
14 (1920); Patrick Fitzgerald, An Insurrection in Print: The Freedom of the Press in Ireland Between 1880 and
1891, 15 U.C. DUBLIN L. REV. 17, 20–21 (2015).
See Fitzgerald, supra note 95, at 120; id. at 20.
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Unlike many developments surveyed above, the new acts of the period were
notable not for their novelty, but for their lack of it. While certain details may have
changed, in general the measures of the early 1880s simply demonstrated the
extent to which various constituent components of martial law had already been
transformed into what were perceived by the authorities as unexceptional
approaches, suitable for dissemination in whatever form might be deemed most
appropriate in the moment.

I. Preventing Crimes, Controlling the Press
The situation became more tense still following the assassination of Chief
Secretary for Ireland Frederick Cavendish and Permanent Under-Secretary
Thomas Henry Burke on May 6, 1882 by the Irish National Invincibles, a
breakaway faction of the Irish Republican Brotherhood. The assassinations led to
passage of the Prevention of Crimes (Ireland) Act of 1882. 97 Among other things,
the Act made it an offense to intimidate or incite others to use intimidation against
someone engaging in a legal act. The Act also allowed the government to seize
newspapers in advance of their publication.
In addition to passing this new Act, the government decided to bring in
experienced personnel in order to form a new Irish secret service department
dedicated to uncovering and fighting subversives, initially named the “Crime
Special Branch.” The job would eventually be awarded to Edward Jenkinson, who
had risen through the ranks of the colonial service in India. Jenkinson took to his
task with relish, becoming an eager proponent of secretive methods and securing
convictions by whatever means possible—including, for instance, the use of
undercover agents and informers, who were widely and credibly rumored to
function as agents provocateurs, that is, witnesses who provoked the crimes and
conspiracies on which the Special Branch focused. 98

97
98

Prevention of Crimes (Ireland) Act 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 25 (Eng.).
Thanks to his successes in Ireland, Jenkinson was soon brought over to England to help with the
campaign against the Fenians there too. The move would lead to his undoing, however, as while he
had had a great degree of leeway in Ireland, Jenkinson’s methods provoked tensions in England,
leading to Jenkinson’s dismissal in 1887 following clashes with the new Metropolitan Police
Commissioner James Monro. For more on both Jenkinson and the development of Special Branch,
including its role as a precursor to the modern intelligence state, see THOMAS FERGUSSON, BRITISH
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 1870–1914: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MODERN INTELLIGENCE
ORGANIZATION 11, 13, 26–27 (1984); PETER GUDGIN, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE: THE BRITISH
STORY 27 (1989); BERNARD PORTER, THE ORIGINS OF THE VIGILANT STATE: THE LONDON
METROPOLITAN POLICE SPECIAL BRANCH BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1987); HAIA SHPAYERMAKOV, THE ASCENT OF THE DETECTIVE: POLICE SLEUTHS IN EDWARDIAN AND VICTORIAN
ENGLAND (2011); Lindsay Clutterbuck, Countering Irish Republican Terrorism in Britain: Its Origin as a
Police Function, 18 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 95 (2007).
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The Criminal Law and Procedure (Ireland) Act of 1887 99 continued the trend
of repressive legislation. Following long-established practice, the Act allowed the
Lord-Lieutenant to declare “proclaimed areas” within which acts of agrarian
violence could be tried as summary offenses. In addition, the Act allowed for the
prohibition of associations, and broadened the offenses relative to which charges
of incitement might be brought to include boycotts unlawful assembly, and
riots. 100
The Act immediately sparked controversy when, after a crowd assembled to
protest the conviction of two men under the Act, the RIC opened fire, killing
three and wounding two, in what came to be known as the Mitchelstown
Massacre. The act was also immediately used to ban the Irish National League,
and to institute an aggressive campaign of press prosecutions. 101
The years that followed were relatively peaceful so the Peace Preservation
Act of 1881 was allowed to lapse in 1906. 102 From the late 1900s on, tensions rose
once again, as both the loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force and the nationalist Irish
Volunteers successfully secured the possession of large quantities of arms, leading
ultimately to the open conflict in the wake of the First World War that would lead
to Ireland’s independence. This finally ended the long period in which Ireland
served as the primary laboratory for the development of Britain’s repressive public
order legal tools.
The new laws of the 1880s were innovative in several ways. First, the move
to a criminal framing was key and represented a serious attempt to reframe the
violence and disorder in order to downgrade and delegitimize resistance to British
rule. 103 The Prevention of Crimes (Ireland) Act was also notable for its renewed
99

100

Criminal Law and Procedure (Ireland) Act 1887, 50 & 51 Vict. c. 20 (Eng.). This Act is also known
as “Balfour’s Crimes Act” and the “Jubilee Coercion Act.”
See id., at § 2.

101

While no prosecutions were undertaken between 1884 and 1886, fourteen took place in 1887,
leading to eleven convictions. See Fitzgerald, supra note 95, at 38, 49. 1887 also saw an important
decision in Beatty v. Gillbanks 331–14 (1882) 9 QB 308, in England, which narrowed the
government’s ability to prosecute protestors. By contrast in O’Kelly v. Harvey 293–94 (1882) 10
ILR 265, 15 Cox CC 435 (CCA), the Irish Court of Appeal made clear that the authorities had broad
discretion for suppressing protests in Ireland, including the use of violence.

102

See K.D. EWING & C.A. GEARTY, THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES: POLITICAL FREEDOM AND
THE RULE OF LAW IN BRITAIN, 1914–1945 333 (2000).

103

In emphasizing control through criminality, authorities in Ireland were following recent
developments in England. Much key penal legislation of the mid to late nineteenth century was
pushed by the “Social Science Association,” a small but powerful group formed in 1857, which was
closely connected to the Liberal party. Amongst other measures, the Social Science Association
successfully pushed forward the 1864 Penal Servitude Act, the 1869 Habitual Criminals Act and the
1871 Prevention of Crimes Act, which collectively tightened police supervision of and power over
released convicts. A new criminal department was created within the Home Office in 1870,
meanwhile, which already by the 1880s was the biggest within the Home Office. See STEFAN
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targeting of publications. Among the notable features of the Act’s attack on the
press were both its authorization of preventive seizures and its emphasis on
intimidation. Previously, authorities would have to rely on seditious libel charges
to make someone criminally liable for criticizing the government. The vague new
category of “intimidation” however was easier to prove, helping to extend the
Act’s reach into a shadowy realm of indeterminate “supportive” activity. 104
Although seditious libel charges were retrospective, the new Act allowed for
prospective seizures.
The Criminal Law and Procedure Act, in addition to once again carrying on
something of both the martial law and peace preservation legacies, further
entrenched the focus on incitement with specific reference to the promotion of
assemblies. The Act also granted the authorities wide power to prohibit
associations. Between them, therefore, these two acts were notable for the extent
to which they completed the shift in focus from a martial law framework, to an
alternative form of repressive legality focused on the suppression of expression,
association and assembly. In doing so, they created a template for what, in relation
to martial law-based suppression, was a comparatively sophisticated, legalistic
form of state suppression of dissent.
Meanwhile, the Crime Special Branch, the forefather of all of Britain’s
modern intelligence agencies, represented yet another component of this modern
approach. Just as the laws had developed to govern an ever-widening set of
activities and to target diverse sources of unrest, so did the intelligence techniques
of the Special Branch and its progeny progress in its ability to provide the modern
state with yet more extensive and intrusive repressive powers.

J. Conclusion: The Evolution
Nineteenth Century Ireland

of

Repressive

Legality

in

As surveyed above, nineteenth century Ireland saw one repressive law passed
after another, as various components of the martial law legacy were introduced
time after time in new formulas and combinations. Much of the nature of the
approach being developed was clear to observers at the time. As one British
observer, Cornewall Lewis, would put it: “[t]he statute-book has been loaded with
the severest laws; the country has been covered with military and police; capital
punishment has been unsparingly inflicted; Australia has been crowded with

104

PETROW, POLICING MORALS: THE METROPOLITAN POLICE
(1994).
See 45 & 46 Vict. c. 25 (Eng.)., supra note 97, at §§ 7, 12.

Summer 2019

29

AND THE

HOME OFFICE 29, 50–51

Chicago Journal of International Law

transported convicts; and all to no purpose.” 105 Half a century later Isaac Butt, a
progressive Irish lawyer, would similarly observe:
Our statute book is a melancholy record of arms acts! Insurrection acts! Acts
for suspending the habeas corpus! For suppressing party processions! For
prohibiting public meetings! As if brute force was the one expedient of Irish
government and the highest object of Irish statesmanship was to crush down
the spirit of the nation ... 106

Looking back, it is possible to gain further perspective on the legacy that was
unfolding. The first thing to note is simply how extensive that legacy was. In
addition to the changing shape and character of the laws being passed, much of
the basic infrastructure of legality was altered as well. As we have seen, a new,
more regularized—and of course, in the Irish context, armed—police force was
put into place. By the century’s end, that police force had been supplemented by
an intelligence service. Along with the new police, a new judicial system was also
constructed, as the traditional magistrate model was gradually supplemented and
replaced by a system of resident, stipendiary magistrates. While private
prosecutions had been the order of the day at the start of the nineteenth century,
by the century’s end they had largely been replaced by public prosecutions.
Relative to all such institutions, Ireland would in fact provide not only a model
for other colonies, but also for mainland Britain itself. 107 They developed first in
Ireland, however, thanks to the unique challenges the authorities faced there in
terms of governing a population that did not desire their governance. 108
105

Townshend, supra note 34, at 67 (citing CORNEWALL LEWIS, LOCAL DISTURBANCES ix (1826)). As
Lewis continued,
Anyone who knows the way in which Irish business that is done is transacted,
will scarcely regret that so much of it is left undone. At the close of every session
in the small hours of the morning a number of small bills are introduced ... and
they generally pass through their stages when the grey dawn of morning is
struggling of the Bude-light through the stained glass windows of the Commons
Hall ... By bills passed in this manner, many of them unquestioned, powers have
been clandestinely given which may have frittered away every free principle of
Irish law.
Id.

106

Maddox, supra note 60, at 250 (citing ISAAC BUTT, HOME GOVERNMENT
FEDERALISM! ITS MEANING, ITS OBJECTS, AND ITS HOPES 83–84 (1870)).

107

On the development of public prosecutions over the course of the nineteenth century in Britain,
see John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1978) (highlighting
that trials with professional prosecutors and defense counsel only became the norm in the latter
half of the century). The period was also notable for an increase in the prevalence and prominence
of lawyers in general, and the development of a more regularized system of case reporting, which
assist these new professionals in plying their trade. For more, see JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS
OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL (2003).
The introduction of Ireland’s fortified police, stipendiary magistrates and intelligence service have
all been addressed above, and were all, clearly, responses to the population’s resistance to British
government. Stipendiary magistrates in particular proved necessary given both the relative absence
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These evolutions were complimented by dramatic evolutions in the law,
motivated by British desire to quash the resistance of the Irish population. While
the British were not above responding with martial or emergency law—as
demonstrated on numerous occasions—they constantly strove to go further,
attempting to find ways to suppress dissent by and through means of the law. The
result was an increasingly thick set of laws designed to attempt to maintain and
secure public order. While the legal frameworks developed may have avoided
some of the worst excesses of martial law, they were in all likelihood more
effective and powerful, in terms of the ultimate goal of maintaining control, as a
result.
The changing nature of the laws adopted by the British may be seen clearly
in the names of the measures adopted. A concern with insurrection and rebellion
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century period gave way to an
emphasis on unlawful oaths and societies, which gave way in turn to a concern
with party processions and disturbances. In each step of this early evolution, the
nature of the legislation adopted directly tracked the nature of the resistance faced.
By the second half of the nineteenth century, however, the British were savvier.
From then on, they worked harder to justify the forms of legality imposed. Thus,
the idea of peace preservation was revived, and complemented with measures
aimed at the protection of life, persons, and property, which were in turn
supplemented and replaced with references to criminality—a reference that

a local magistrate class, and the fact that, where present, such individuals were often intimidated by
the potential aggression they might face should they pursue their roles vigorously. Similarly, public
prosecution developed in Ireland due to the unwillingness of the Irish to initiate prosecutions. As
one former RIC officer would put it in 1881:
Not one in five hundred of the community, be he gentleman or peasant, looks
upon the commission of crime as a matter affecting anybody but the
government. It is entirely a matter for the police, and neither the desire for
security nor the temptation of a large reward will induce any person to offer
assistance.
Richard Hawkins, The ‘Irish Model’ and the Empire: A Case for Reassessment, in POLICING THE EMPIRE:
GOVERNMENT, AUTHORITY AND CONTROL, 1830–1940 26 (David Anderson & David Killingray
eds., 1991) (quoting Henry A. Blake, The Irish Police, in 9 NINETEENTH CENTURY 392 (James
Knowles ed., 1881)). For more, see Ian Bridgeman, The Constabulary and the Criminal Justice System in
Nineteenth-Century Ireland, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE HISTORY: THEMES AND CONTROVERSIES FROM PREINDEPENDENCE IRELAND (Ian O’Donnell & Finbarr McAuley eds., 2003); Niamh Howlin,
Nineteenth Century Criminal Justice: Uniquely Irish or Simply Not English?, 3 IRISH J. LEGAL STUD. 67
(2013); John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution and Common Law, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
313 (1973); R.B. McDowell, The Irish Courts of Law, 1801–1914, 10 IRISH HIST. STUD. 363 (1957);
John McEldowney, Crown Prosecutions in Nineteenth-Century Ireland, in POLICING AND PROSECUTION
IN BRITAIN, 1750–1850 (Douglas Hay & Francis Snyder eds., 1989). Interestingly, the rise of public
prosecutions occurred more or less at the same time in America as in Ireland, where it was also
linked to the development of a modern police force, and to the general extension of state power
and control. See Yue Ma, Exploring the Origins of Public Prosecution, 18 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 190, 203
(2008).
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suggested both the absolute illegitimacy of resistance, and that the authorities
ultimately had the situation under control.
The manner in which the authorities went about their suppressive task
gradually evolved as well. While the authorities continued to utilize more direct
tools of suppression when called upon to do so—through the deployment of
martial law courts, other special tribunals, curfews, extended powers of search and
detention, and other restrictive measures—as time went on, the British also
introduced a variety of more regularized and subtler forms of control. Most
centrally, these measures aimed to control and limit expression, association, and
assembly, not only ex post but also, where possible, ex ante. With time, the British
developed legal frameworks governing, limiting and controlling speech, the press,
assemblies, and associations in advance of their expression or formation, thereby
averting potential crises, the need to deploy more draconian responses, and the
potential backlash such confrontations might cause. Fundamental here was the
attempt to extend liability outward from direct participants to those who could be
claimed in one way or another to have encouraged unrest, a development
encapsulated in the concept of incitement, under which the shadow of the law
could be advanced into an ever-wider terrain.
Legal evolutions in Ireland over the course of the nineteenth century hence
represented a very particular confluence of forces. While the institution of martial
law always remained a possibility on the horizon, it was, in general, directly
employed less and less. This did not represent an out-and-out rejection of martial
law however. Rather, the legal framework in colonial Ireland evolved gradually
from the martial law frame. In early phases, this typically involved either the more
localized application of martial law, or the application of certain component
features of martial law in a piecemeal manner. In later phases, it turned to the
suppression of expression, the press, assembly, and association we have seen,
combined with the evolution of a variety of institutions, including a quasi-military
police service, a special judiciary, public prosecutors, and, eventually, a new
intelligence service.
While the harshest abuses of martial law were avoided, the frame that
replaced them employed a mode of repression that was all the more effective
because it was advanced through relatively detailed and sophisticated laws, backed
up by the development of supportive institutions. The fear that contemporary
legal scholars have articulated that current modes of exceptional legality may bleed
back in and infect the contemporary frame of legality, therefore, appears in the
light of this history to imagine too sharp a dichotomy between normal and
exceptional frames of law. In reality, the history of nineteenth century Ireland
reveals that the development of the ‘rule of law’ did not so much involve a sharp
break with martial law as a gradual recasting and reshaping of it in which many of
its underlying aims and functionalities were preserved.
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As long as such evolutions in the law were linked to Ireland alone, the model
being developed remained limited, not least due to the fact that its historical
trajectory and its origins in overt repression were still too clear. In order to become
more accepted, and ultimately normalized, such a legal form would first have to
be widely deployed. The British Empire provided fertile terrain for the necessary
dissemination, and thereby the wider normalization, of such a model. While legal
emulation, dissemination, and migration have always occurred, the late nineteenth
century, known as a highpoint of globalization generally, was no less so in the
province of law. As the following pages detail, this was true with regard to the
legal model in question, which was exported to much of the rest of the empire
during the turn of the century.

III. G LOBAL D ISSEMINA TION
In the British Empire as elsewhere, the turn of the nineteenth to the
twentieth century ushered in dramatic changes. The late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries were a period of unprecedented globalization of trade,
investment, and migration, 109 enabled by and leading to expansions in
information, communications, and transportation technology. 110 It was a period
in which European standards and metrics were globally disseminated, and
perceptions of space and time were reordered. 111 While international
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111
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nongovernmental organizations and cultural movements did not originate in the
period, they expanded rapidly in the new, more globalized environment. 112
It was also a period of substantial unrest. A global depression, sparked by a
financial collapse in Vienna, began in 1873. 113 The global depression continued
until 1879, while in Britain, the ‘long depression’ lasted until the late 1890s. 114
Despite the depression, industrialization continued apace, while the population of
both Britain and its colonies, and that of the empire’s cities in particular, continued
to grow. Amongst the results was a dramatic growth in labor unrest across the
British colonial world.
Despite or perhaps because of these economic challenges, Britain expanded
its empire during the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century. That
expansion was met in turn by increasing levels of resistance. The period saw the
formation of new anti-colonial organizations, organized not only within the
colonies but also in the metropole itself: the Indian National Congress, founded
in 1885, was complimented by a British Committee in 1889, 115 while the first PanAfrican Conference took place in London in 1900. 116 Across the imperial world,
British rule was increasingly met with resistance of every sort, from peaceful
protests and lawsuits, to strikes and demonstrations, to violent confrontation.
In the face of this heightened resistance, the British turned, naturally, to the
tools they had been developing in Ireland over the course of the previous century.
The Sections below explore the manner in which similar approaches were
112
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deployed in three colonies in particular: India, South Africa, and Nigeria. While
these three colonies have been chosen as examples, they were not alone in
receiving such laws—rather, similar trends could have been detected operating
more or less universally across the empire.

A. India
India had a long history under East India Company rule even prior to the
state’s assumption of official control, and with it, its own history of the
entrenchment of emergency legislation as well. The 1818 Bengal State Prisoners
Regulation, which allowed for detention without trial in cases in which “the
security of British dominion from foreign hostility and internal commotion” was
at stake, was one particularly important precedent. 117 With the 1857 revolt, a host
of new legislative measures were passed that further advanced emergency
governance, including the 1857 State Offences Act, 118 which allowed local officials
to proclaim states of rebellion; the 1857 Military and State Offences Act119 and
Heinous Offences Act, 120 which allowed for trials by court martial; and the 1858
State Prisoners Act, 121 which generalized the 1818 Bengali State Prisoners
Regulation. 122 Such measures represented the Indian analogue to the more direct
encapsulations of emergency governance through law seen previously in Ireland
in the turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century.
Following the establishment of crown rule in 1858, the strength of the
British government in India gradually grew. Nationalist sentiment grew over the
same period as well however. The British Indian Association, which had been
founded in 1851, split into two factions in 1871, over the question of whether to
push for Indian political representation immediately, or to adopt a more gradualist
approach. In 1876 Surendranath Banerjee and Ananda Mohan Bose established
the more overtly nationalist Indian National Association, which would soon be
merged into the Indian National Congress, which had its first session at the end
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of 1885 in Bombay, generally uniting India’s nationalists in a single, powerful
nationalist organization. 123

1. Controlling Communications
As nationalist sentiment grew, so did criticism of the government. Britain’s
launching of the Second Afghan War in 1878 sparked particular criticism. In
response to that criticism, the British promulgated the Vernacular Press Act. 124
The act targeted newspapers written in “Oriental languages,” which were required
to submit their content to the police prior to publication. In addition, the act
provided for censorship of objectionable articles, and allowed for editors to be
jailed should they publish seditious materials. To cap such measures off, the act
immunized itself from challenge in court. The act was, however, met with ongoing
widespread protest, which led to its withdrawal in 1881.
In 1879 Banerjee founded the English language newspaper The Bengali, which
became a major forum for Indian nationalist voices and the expression of dissent.
After his publication of a particularly contentious article in the paper in 1883,
Banerjee was arrested, once again sparking widespread protests. In response, the
British developed a new suppressive press law, the Indian Telegraph Act,
promulgated in 1885, 125 which prohibited obscene or subversive writings. The
provisions of the act would be reiterated and entrenched by the Post Office Act
in 1898. 126
A series of communal clashes in 1893 were seen as a serious concern by the
British authorities, who dispatched armed police and soldiers to disperse them.
Several were killed in the course of the resulting suppression. The response
marked a shift on the part of the authorities towards a greater willingness to utilize
strong and often lethal force as a means of crowd control. 127 Following the unrest,
the number of police in Bombay nearly doubled, while the number of mounted
police tripled. In 1894, the government of India issued an order prohibiting the
use of blank ammunition, on a theory—advanced by the report put together in
123
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the wake of the contemporaneous Featherstone clashes in England—that the
swift deployment of lethal force would suppress a riot more quickly, and hence
would lead to fewer casualties when all was said and done. 128
While the perverse legal guidance of the Featherstone report applied to both
the metropole and the colonies, the real determinant of the amount of force the
authorities would feel free to use was political. Thus, in Britain, the authorities
used lethal force less and less over the course of the nineteenth century out of fear
of the public response. In India, however, the security forces did not have to pay
the same heed to popular sentiment. 129 For instance, the authorities were quick to
use live ammunition to suppress labor unrest in Calcutta, leading to eleven strikers
being killed in one incident in 1897. 130
The increasing use of force in the cities had a more brutal analogue in
disputed areas of the countryside as well. Following uprisings in what would soon
thereafter be the Northwest Frontier Province in 1897 and 1898, the British
organized a force of some 35,000 British and Indian soldiers, which set out on the
Tirah Expedition. Local forces refused to engage the British soldiers directly,
resorting instead to guerilla tactics. The British responded by razing villages to the
ground, a policy of collective punishment they continued to employ until the
rebels came to the bargaining table. 131
As the above indicates, the British faced numerous different challenges in
India as the nineteenth century came to a close, which they responded to with
modulated approaches. In the more restive border regions, the British deployed a
more direct, military approach, in which collective punishment was the norm. In
the cities, such as Bombay and Calcutta, communal tensions and labor unrest were
met with live fire.
128
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Above and beyond such more direct approaches, the British attempted to
find other, less brutal, more subtle, and hence more effective ways to enhance
their control. Central here were the measures they took to expand their control
over the press. While the Vernacular Press Act was effectively resisted, the
relatively innocuously named Telegraph Act132 and Post Office Act133 more
effectively allowed the authorities to extend the reach of their suppressive powers.
While the acts were primarily concerned with targeting subversive content, by
targeting obscenity as well they cloaked these more overtly suppressive functions
in a veil of morality, while furthering their primary purpose by implicitly
suggesting the immorality of subversive content.

2. Preserving Order
The situation in India was tense during Lord Curzon’s time as Viceroy, from
1899 to 1905, as his inflexible approach met sharp resistance from the Indian
National Congress. 134 In response, much legislation of the period aimed to limit
assemblies. Bombay’s 1902 Police Act was particularly sophisticated. 135 The
legislation required those planning assemblies to obtain prior permission, while
allowing the police commissioner to prohibit them where he deemed such
prohibition “necessary for the preservation of the public peace or public safety.” 136
In addition, the act gave the authorities the power to “direct the conduct … and
behavior” of processions and assemblies, including by determining where they
might, and might not, take place. 137 Recalling Ireland’s Party Processions Act, the
act gave the authorities the power to prohibit and penalize “the delivery of
harangues, the use of gestures or mimetic representations, and the preparation,
exhibition or dissemination of pictures, symbols, placards, or of any other object
or thing” likely to “inflame religious animosity or hostility between different
132
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classes, or incite to a commission of an offence, to a disturbance of the public
peace or to resistance to or contempt of the law.” 138 Finally, as a catchall, the act
gave the police the general authority to “keep order on and in all streets, quays,
wharves, landing-places and all other public places or places of public resort.” 139
On October 16, 1905, the government put into effect a plan to partition
Bengal into two states. In response, Banerjee, who had been elected president of
the Indian National Congress in 1902, organized an extensive campaign of
petitions and protests. For his efforts, Banerjee was imprisoned in 1906. 140 In
response both to the protests themselves and the wider rise in nationalist
sentiment and organizational strength they demonstrated, the British
implemented a range of more assertively repressive measures. In 1907, the
government of India prohibited entry of the Indian Sociologist as well as other
“revolutionary” materials published abroad. 141 The government also issued
emergency ordinances in Punjab, East Bengal, and Assam, allowing for the
prohibition of public meetings and strict controls on the publication of materials
deemed seditious. 142
These measures were complemented by passage of what was known in brief
as the 1907 Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act, and in full as “[a]n act to make
better provision for the prevention of public meetings likely to promote sedition
or to cause a disturbance of public tranquility.” 143 The act was to apply as and
138
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when the local government “proclaimed” a region. Where a region was
proclaimed, written notice was required to hold a public meeting, 144 and the
magistrates and police commissioners were given the power to prohibit such
meetings where they deemed them “likely to promote sedition or disaffection or
to cause a disturbance of the public tranquility.” 145 In addition, the law penalized
those delivering “any lecture, address or speech on any subject likely to cause
disturbance or public excitement or on any political subject” in public in a
proclaimed area. 146
The measures of the early to mid-1900s once again demonstrated how,
within India, a range of measures were adopted depending on the particulars of
the situation faced. In the more restive Punjab, East Bengal, and Assam,
emergency ordinances were passed to govern the situation. In Bombay, on the
other hand, the challenge of protests was met by new legislation, which granted
the authorities a more formalized, regularized power with which to challenge
protesters and stamp out dissent. 147 The Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act,
like much Irish legislation before it, split the difference, utilizing the time-tested
proclaimed district approach, but this time primarily as authorization to limit the
power of assemblies as such.

3. Controlling the Press
Having developed their tools for the suppression of assemblies, colonial
authorities turned their attention back to the press. The 1908 Newspaper
(Incitement to Offences) Act 148 stipulated that newspapers would forfeit their
printing presses, where a magistrate deemed that they had printed a provision
containing an incitement to violence. The Newspaper (Incitement to Offences)
Act was immediately put to use to charge several papers and editors. 149
1908 also saw passage of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 150 which had
two major effects. First, it gave the government the power to ban associations that
it understood to be engaging in seditious activities. In addition, it allowed crimes
144
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of nationalist violence to be tried before special, three-judge tribunals, to enable
the authorities to more easily obtain convictions in such cases.
In 1909, Madal Lal Dhingra killed William Hutt Curzon Wyllie, the aide-decamp to the Secretary of State for India, in London. Amongst the effects of the
murder was an increase in the surveillance of Indians in Britain, including through
the formation of a new section of Special Branch, which eventually became the
Indian Political Intelligence Service, supervised by John Wallinger. 151 The previous
prohibition of the importation of “dangerous publications” was replaced by a
generalized ban, enforced by giving the Post Office wide discretionary powers to
censor the transmission of telegrams and messages. The same year, Guy Aldred,
the (British) printer of the Indian Sociologist, was put on trial for sedition. 152
In 1910, the India Press Act was passed. 153 The act required newspapers to
submit securities to local governments, which could be confiscated, together with
the papers themselves, if those papers were deemed to have published any of a
range of statements. In particular, penalizable content included:
any words, signs or visible representations which are likely or may have a
tendency, directly or indirectly, whether by inference, suggestion, allusion,
metaphor, implication or otherwise –
(a) to incite to murder . . . or any act of violence, or
(b) to seduce any officer, soldier or sailor . . . from his allegiance or his duty,
or
(c) to bring into hatred or contempt His Majesty or Government . . . or
(d) to put any person into fear or to cause annoyance to him and thereby
to induce him to deliver to any person any property or valuable security,
or to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do
any act which he is legally entitled to do, or
(e) to encourage or incite any person to interfere with the administration
of the law or with the maintenance of law and order, or
(f) to convey any threat of injury to a public servant, or to any person in
whom that public servant is believed to be interested, with a view to
inducing the public servant to do any act or to forbear or delay to do
any act connected with the exercise of his public functions . . . 154
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The enhanced response in Britain led Indian revolutionaries to move their European operations
from Britain to other countries on the continent. In response, the Indian Political Intelligence
Service broadened its operations as well. For more, see RICHARD POPPLEWELL, INTELLIGENCE AND
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1924, 135–41 (1995); BRÜCKENHAUS, supra note 140, at 21.
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In short, a paper would have to be very careful if it hoped not to potentially
infringe the broad and open-ended list of prohibited statements included in the
act. In addition, the act gave the authorities broad powers to search and seize
property where it was found that particular papers had published statements in
violation of the law, as well as for increased controls over the mail. 155 In practice,
the act led to the immediate shutdown of numerous papers, due to the papers’
inability to provide the securities required for their existence. Many more were
banned. 156
In the new, more globalized context of the twentieth century, British efforts
to suppress Indian resistance, like that resistance itself, became increasingly
transnational. In part thanks to the new complexity of the situation, in part simply
in response to the growing strength of the resistance movement, a new intelligence
service focused on India was created in the period, while the Post Office Act was
used to suppress communications. Most fundamentally, however, the British in
the 1900s and 1910s focused on the suppression of the press. The 1910 Press Act
went even further than measures taken in Ireland in terms of extending the
shadow of the law. Through the devilishly effective combination of the
requirement that securities be paid, and by utilization of such broad and vague
language to target expression that, in the end, few journalists or publishers could
be sure of where they stood.

4. Conclusion: Attempting to Prevent the Assembling of a National
Consciousness
British India was a massive and diverse territory. British approaches to
governance hence naturally varied depending upon the nature of the local
resistances and challenges faced. Outside those border regions where military
confrontation, collective punishment and emergency ordinance were the norm,
however, British governance in late nineteenth and early twentieth century India
was taking a by-now familiar form. Over the course of the turn of the century, the
British relied primarily, within the cities and in relation to the increasingly
organized and capable nationalist movement, on three types of repression:
suppression of expression, and of the rapidly growing press in particular;
censorship, especially of transnational communications; and suppression of
assemblies. Particularly impressive in this context were Bombay’s Preservation of
Order Act, with its granting of a comprehensive web of regulatory powers, and
the India Press Act, with its suppression of papers by means of the combination
of broad and vague prohibitions and financial penalties.
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See id. at §§ 7, 13-15.

156

For more, see V. Venkat Raman, The Indian Press Act of 1910: The Press and Public Opinion at Crossroads
in the Madras Presidency 1910–1922, 60 PROC. OF THE INDIAN HIST. CONG. 863, 865–6 (1999).
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In many of these measures, the Irish influence could be directly felt. In the
late 1800s and again with the 1908 Newspaper and 1910 Press Acts, a key focus
in India was on control of the press—an emphasis already developed by Ireland’s
1870 Peace Preservation Act. Bombay’s Police Act, meanwhile, directly recalled
Ireland’s Party Processions Act, while the Seditious Meetings Act, with its
deployment of the potential of proclaiming unsettled areas, clearly drew from the
peace preservation tradition. More broadly, the approach in India emulated that
in Ireland both in its reliance on increasingly formalized and sophisticated
approaches, and in its tendency to layer one repressive approach on top of
another. Hence, in India as in Ireland, the evolution of the rule of law, and topdown government repression, were developments that went hand in hand.

B. South Africa
As of the 1870s, European-colonized South Africa comprised four major
areas: the Cape of Good Hope and Natal, both British colonies, and the Orange
Free State and the Republic of Transvaal, under the control of the Boers. De facto
unification would come with the Boer War of 1899–1902, followed by official
unification of the whole territory as the Union of South Africa in 1910.
The Boer War was a major event, with numerous local, imperial, and global
ramifications. 157 While the concentration camp was not invented in South
Africa, 158 the use of such camps in South Africa constituted an important step in
the early dissemination and normalization of the camp model as a part of modern

157
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For more on tensions within the British government during the war, see KEITH SURRIDGE,
MANAGING THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR, 1899–1902: POLITICIANS VERSUS GENERALS (1998). For
more on the significance of the war relative to political debates in Britain, see BERNARD SEMMEL,
IMPERIALISM AND SOCIAL REFORM: ENGLISH SOCIAL-IMPERIAL THOUGHT 1895–1914 (1968),
especially Chapter III. For more on the war’s effects relative to the reform of the British military,
see VOGLER, supra note 42, at 88). For more on the war’s generation of various efforts in Britain
“to mould an ‘imperial race’”, see DANE KENNEDY, BRITAIN AND EMPIRE, 1880–1945, 30 (2002).
They had been previously deployed in 1896 by the Spanish government in Cuba, leading to some
100,000 deaths, immediately after which they were deployed by the U.S. in the Philippines. For
more on the latter, see BRIAN LINN, THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND THE COUNTERINSURGENCY
IN THE PHILIPPINE WAR, 1899–1902 (1989); GLENN MAY, BATTLE FOR BATANGAS: A PHILIPPINE
PROVINCE AT WAR (1991).
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warfare in general, and anti-guerilla warfare in particular. 159 Some 50,000 persons,
mostly children, are estimated to have starved to death in South Africa’s camps. 160
In addition, the Boer war served to introduce a new system of policing into
South Africa. Following initial successes in the war, the British appointed ‘military
governors’ over the newly conquered territories, supported by new police forces.
Initial victories did not mark the end of the conflict so much as the beginning of
its guerilla phase. In the first period of its existence, the newly created South
African Constabulary played a military role, fighting back against the guerilla
tactics adopted by Boer insurgents. When the fighting ended, it was perhaps too
late to remodel the South African Constabulary along more civilian lines, and their
semi-military character became entrenched. 161 In fact, the authorities had little
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160
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desire to reform the police, as a militarized constabulary was seen as best able to
guard against the twin fears of black and/or Afrikaner rebellion. 162

1. Preserving the Peace
For present purposes, the greatest significance of the war was the legal order
instituted in its wake. As Chanock has observed,
In the period from the 1890s onwards, the instability of the South African
Republic, the war, the subsequent fragility of the new Union and the
continued industrial strife all contributed to a vigorous development of the
common law relating to offences against the state, and, especially as African
opposition grew, to the development of statute law aimed at controlling and
criminalising political opposition. 163

Key in this context was the Indemnity and Peace Preservation Act,
promulgated in the Transvaal in 1902. 164 The ordinance replaced the martial law
that had been applicable during the Boer War with a legalized frame not dissimilar
to the martial law it was replacing; as the law put it, while it was “desirable to
withdraw Martial Law,” it was also “desirable in view of the withdrawal of Martial
Law to make special provision for the maintenance of good order and government
and the public safety of this Colony.” 165 In the first place, the ordinance
immunized from liability those officials who had committed questionable acts “in
good faith” during the war, and confirmed those sentences that had been issued
by court martials. The ordinance also took several more prospective measures.
Persons suspected of seditious words or acts could be arrested without warrant.
Buildings suspected to contain seditious or treasonable documents could be
searched. Letters suspected of containing seditious or treasonable content could
be stopped. Sedition as such was penalized. 166
162

163
164
165
166

See W.B. WORSFOLD, RECONSTRUCTION OF THE NEW COLONIES UNDER LORD MILNER 166 (1913);
MARTIN CHANOCK, THE MAKING OF SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL CULTURE, 1902–1936, 46 (2001).
CHANOCK, supra note 162, at 133.
Ordinance No. 38 of 1902.
Id. at Preamble.
Sedition was defined by the intent:
1. to bring His Majesty or the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor … into
hatred or contempt; or
2. to excite disaffection against His Majesty or the Governor or LieutenantGovernor . . . or the Government and Constitution of the United
Kingdom or of the Transvaal . . . or the administration of justice therein;
or
3. to incite His Majesty’s subjects to attempt to procure otherwise than by
lawful means the alteration of any matter . . . by law established; or
4. to incite any person to commit any crime in disturbance of the public
peace; or
5. to raise discontent and disaffection amongst His Majesty’s subjects; or
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In addition, the ordinance also imposed various limitations on freedom of
movement. Individuals were required to have a permit in order to enter the
Transvaal, and those without permits could be expelled. 167 The LieutenantGovernor was given discretionary power, moreover, to order persons deemed
“dangerous to the peace and good Government of the country” to leave. 168
Finally, the law allowed the Lieutenant-Governor to make regulations in order to
“preven[t] the willful or reckless spreading of false intelligence calculated to create
panic or alarm,” to “prohibi[t] the holding of meetings at which there is reasonable
suspicion that seditious speeches will be made,” or to “prohibit the introduction
into this Colony or circulation therein of any printed matter of a treasonable or
seditious character.” 169
The Transvaal’s importation of the peace preservation model was hence
even more of an omnibus piece of legislation than many of the original Irish peace
preservation acts. The manner in which the law was explicitly introduced to
replace martial law, with a still highly restrictive but nonetheless legalized scheme,
provided a particularly concrete illustration of the sort of dynamic that has been
observed throughout this Article. In terms of content, the act combined more
directly emergency-like measures, in particular expanded powers of search and
detention, with second-order approaches of the sort considered throughout, most
prominently controls over the circulation of materials deemed seditious, as well as
broader controls on speech and assembly. The controls on movement, finally,
represented the most notably South African component of the legislation, forming
one among many sources for, and articulations of, the tight regime of control over
the movement of persons that would grow over time into the full-fledged
apartheid system.

2. Establishing a Secure New Order
The postwar period in the Transvaal also saw passage of an amendment to
the Law relating to the Registration of Newspapers, which required that papers
register their names and addresses, as well as those of every “proprietor printer
publisher manager and responsible editor,” with the Colonial Secretary. 170 The law
also allowed for criminal proceedings to be taken against all those affiliated with
such papers on the basis of libels printed within them.
6.

to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different classes of His
Majesty’s subjects . . .

Id. at Art. 18.
167
168
169
170

Id. at Arts. 19–21.
Id. at Art. 24.
Id. at Art. 25.
Ordinance No. 49 of 1902.

46

Vol. 20 No. 1

From the State of Emergency to the Rule of Law

Roberts

The Union of South Africa came into being on May 31, 1910. Among the
first laws adopted by the new state were the Defence Act 171 and the National
Police Act, 172 both adopted in 1912, which essentially institutionalized the quasimilitary police system bequeathed by the Boer War. 173
1913 and 1914 saw the outbreak of major strikes amongst white workers in
the Transvaal, first in the form of a railway strike and then in the form of a general
strike in Johannesburg. Soldiers were brought in to suppress the strikes, and some
2,500 reservists sworn in. In January 1914, Jan Smuts, who was overseeing the
combined portfolios of Minister of Interior, Mines and Defence, declared martial
law and ordered the arrest and deportation of the leaders of the strike. 174
The amendments to the Transvaal’s Newspaper Registration law provided a
subtle but nonetheless notable step towards more effective control over the press
in South Africa. On its face, the new provision requiring that information be
provided concerning all those in some way connected to the publication of papers
seemed a reasonable requirement of transparency. Forcing transparency on such
an issue provided a means, however, through which additional pressure could be
exerted on publishers through the criminal penalization of libel advanced by the
same law. In short, the extent of the transparency required, in such a context,
served primarily to extend the threat of serious legal penalty, thus exerting a
chilling effect on speech.
The new National Police Act 175 and Defence Act, 176 meanwhile, entrenched
the quasi-military police within the South African order. If the quasi-military
police represented one small step away from a martial law regime and towards a
more regularized one, the use of martial law to repress the 1914 strikes indicated
that martial law was only ever that one small step away. Perversely, this recourse
to a more brutal and direct form of martial law if anything likely only served to
legitimize the regularized forms of repression otherwise operative in South Africa
by serving as a reminder that state was ever-ready to escalate its use of direct,
violent force.
171

Officially, “Act to provide for the Defence of the Union and for matters incidental thereto,” Act
13 of 1912 [hereinafter Act 13 of 1912].
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Act 14 of 1912.
The new police force established by the acts was explicitly imagined in quasi-military terms, as the
“first line of defence, as is shown during disturbances and riots,” by E.H. Louw, and as “a highly
centralized little army,” by J.X. Merriman (both Louw and Merriman were members of parliament).
Meanwhile, the even more militarized South African Mounted Rifles, a strike force created to deal
with emergencies, was also created, and in fact ended up slightly larger than the ‘civilian’ police
force. See CHANOCK, supra note 162, at 49.
For more, see id. at 137.
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3. Controlling Labor Unrest
In July 1914, the Riotous Assemblies and Criminal Law Amendment Act, 177
prepared in the aftermath of the strikes, came into force. The act gave magistrates
the power to prohibit public gatherings, to close public spaces, and to disperse
unlawful gatherings by force, while also expanding the common law offense of
incitement, to include any act or spoken word which it “might reasonably be
expected” would lead as a “natural and probably [sic] consequenc[e]” to “the
commission of public violence.” 178 The act also defined a series of new criminal
labor-related offences, including intimidation, restraint, picketing, blacklisting, and
the uttering of opprobrious epithets, as well as criminalizing the breaking of
contracts by light, power, water, sanitary and transportation service employees,
and incitement or conspiracy to commit any such offenses. Finally, the act set up
special courts to try those cases brought under it.
While utilizing the emergency law approach of authorizing special courts, for
the most part the Riotous Assemblies and Criminal Law Amendment Act targeted
assemblies in a relatively legalized, sophisticated, and for that reason, all the more
effective manner. In the first place, the law allowed for a variety of prior
constraints and prohibitions designed to prevent assemblies before they might
gather strength—measures through which the authorities could narrow the space
for assemblies, minimizing the potential for more direct, violent confrontations.
In addition, the law followed the model developed in Ireland by deploying the
category of incitement, allowing convictions based on reasonably foreseeable
effects rather than intentions, thereby widening the scope and range of the law’s
dissuasive effects. Finally, the law utilized a criminal frame to target a broad range
of activities potentially related to mass labor action, providing the authorities with
an extensive range of tools through which to strike out at labor organizers,
unionists and strikers, those it considered the source of the greatest threat.

4. Conclusion: Entrenching a Securitized Order
While, as we have seen, the repressive approaches to public order legality in
both Ireland and India both drew upon martial law legacies, in South Africa the
transition was the most direct of all. The 1902 Indemnity and Peace Preservation
Act in the Transvaal provided a clear and explicit bridge from the emergency to
the post-emergency order, in which numerous components of emergency legality
were preserved. As elsewhere, recourse to martial law remained a possibility in
South Africa in the years to come, as demonstrated by the deployment of martial
law to suppress the Transvaal strikes in 1914. 179 Rather than undermining the
177
178
179

Act 27 of 1914.
Id. at 139.
For more on the persistence of martial law within South African legal culture, see CHANOCK, supra
note 162. Martial law would be declared again in 1915 and 1922. See id. at 140–1.
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authorities, the potential for this more immediately violent form of control to be
deployed likely helped to provide a perverse sort of legitimacy to the more
regularized forms of repressive governance adopted in the South African context.
They could only appear less directly harmful and violent by comparison.
As in the Indian context, the South African context indicates the clear
influence of the sorts of approaches previously developed in Ireland. The
Transvaal’s Indemnity and Peace Preservation Act did not attempt to hide this,
betraying its connection to the peace preservation tradition on its face. The South
African police force, like those everywhere, was of course heavily influenced by
the RIC, as well as by South Africa’s own transition out of a more directly
conflictual frame. The Riotous Assemblies and Criminal Law Amendment Act,
meanwhile, followed much of the regulative approach to assemblies that had
developed in Ireland, while also incorporating and relying strongly upon the
productively repressive language of incitement. In general, moreover, the South
African government payed particular attention both to the press and to
assemblies, recognizing the virtues of attempting to suppress pressure for change
before serious momentum could build. South Africa too, therefore, drew upon,
helped to expand, and helped to normalize the developing model, while both
magnifying and augmenting several of its more repressive components.

C. Nigeria
British rule in the area that would later be united to form Nigeria evolved
gradually. Early policing was conducted in significant part under the auspices of
the United African Company, later known as the Royal Niger Company, which
was formed in the 1870s, and given a formal mandate from 1886 to 1899. 180 In
1890 George Annesley, the Acting Consul of the Oil Rivers Protectorate,
organized a new police force, which he promptly used to attack Andemeno, the
King of Enyong, who was resisting British encroachment. This led to numerous
complaints to Clause MacDonald, the new Consul appointed in 1891, which led
him to disband that force. MacDonald was shortly thereafter replaced by Ralph
Moor, a former RIC Inspector, who established a new, quasi-military force,
known as the Court Messengers, to police the territory, by that time known as the
Niger Coast Protectorate. When the Court Messengers were not available, local
military forces were relied on to conduct policing tasks, such as conducting arrests.
180
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A formally civil police force was meanwhile established in Lagos in 1896, though
its civil nature was rendered questionable by the fact that the policemen were
armed, and by the fact that almost all the officers were former soldiers. This new
force, which had responsibility not only for arrests and public order but also for
conducting prosecutions and operating prisons, was also heavily influenced by the
RIC model, utilizing RIC rifles and sending its officers to be trained in Ireland. 181
In 1900 the Crown assumed control over all three of Nigeria’s regions—
Lagos, the Northern Protectorate, and the Southern Protectorate. The more
restive north would see the establishment of the most aggressive police force, the
quasi-military Northern Nigeria police force, which rapidly expanded from a force
of fifty to over one thousand by 1903. 182

1. Clamping Down on the Press
The new era of a unified Nigeria saw increasing resistance to British rule,
which was met, in accordance with the Irish model, with an increasingly extensive
and restrictive array of repressive laws and regulations. As Bonny Ibhawoh notes,
“as early as 1900, a vigorous and articulate class of educated Africans had
established control of the local newspaper press.” 183 While the press had been at
least partially sympathetic to the British early on, “by the 1900s . . . the placid
mood of the late nineteenth century suddenly gave way to an eruption of scathing
attacks.” 184
In response to this new climate, a Newspaper Ordinance was passed in
1903. 185 As the Lagos Weekly Record put it, the ordinance was “a measure calculated
to militate in no small degree against the people’s interest and rights;” in its
defense, Acting Chief Justice E.A. Smith stated that “it is rare to find an absolutely
free press anywhere in the world.” 186 Amongst other things, the ordinance
required that every paper submit a £250 libel bond, effectively pricing out smaller
periodicals. 187
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In 1908, a pamphlet titled “Governor Egerton and the Railway,” written by
Herbert Macaulay, known as the “father of Nigerian nationalism,” was distributed,
criticizing the colonial government’s corruption. 188 In response to this, as well as
to broader attacks on the government’s land acquisition and water rate policies,
Egerton looked to the precedent developed in India, and on September 22, 1909,
the Seditious Offences Ordinance was passed into law in Nigeria. 189 The law
penalized anyone who brought or attempted to bring “into hatred or contempt . . .
the government” of Southern Nigeria, as well as punishing anyone who might
have made, published, or circulated “any statement, rumour or report, with intent
to cause, or which is likely to cause any officer of the Government of Southern
Nigeria or any person otherwise in the service of His Majesty to disregard or fail
in his duty.” 190
Control by law in early twentieth century Nigeria was hence marked, as in
India and South Africa, by an emphasis on control of the press. Nigeria’s
Newspaper Ordinance employed the same approach that would later be employed
by the India Press Act, suppressing the press by effectively pricing newspapers
out of existence before they could even get started. The Seditious Offences
Ordinance meanwhile was notable inter alia for its emphasis on “statements,”
“rumors,” or “reports” which were simply “likely to cause” some failing of duty
on the part of the government—a standard that neither required intent, nor in fact
any actual negative outcome. Between them,, the two laws dramatically extended
the power of the authorities to punish those voicing oppositional sentiments.

2. Legalizing Collective Punishment
In addition to the measures taken against the newly assertive nationalist
press, forceful measures were taken against the broader population as well.
Collective punishment had long been a feature of British governance in Nigeria,
taking the form for instance of the burning down of houses when members of a
village were deemed not sufficiently cooperative in assisting the authorities’
pursuit of a suspected criminal. 191 Such collective punishment was not a feature
of the law as such; that was changed, however, by passage of the Collective
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Punishment Ordinance in 1912, 192 making legal and official collective fines and
penalties of forced labor, where the guilty party could not be identified. 193 As if
that were not bad enough, demonstrating an awareness of the shocking nature of
such a measure, the law also stipulated that no legal challenges might be brought
against it, nor against those orders issued under it, ousting the jurisdiction of both
colonial and local courts.
1912 also saw passage of the Unsettled District Ordinance, by which the
government granted itself the power to arrest and punish persons of “undesirable
character and reputation” within any district declared “unsettled.” 194 The
ordinance was aimed “at getting rid of ‘objectionable persons trading in the
unsettled districts of the interior’,” while “Gov. Walter Egerton specifically made
it clear that the ordinance was desired to prohibit from all unsettled districts such
‘aliens’ as the ‘black lawyer’ and the ‘Lagos agitator.’” 195
Finally, the Peace Preservation Ordinance of the same year 196 allowed the
governor to declare portions of Nigeria disturbed, allowing for arbitrary search
and preventive detention for up to a year, arrest for possession of arms and
ammunition, and the imposition of heavy fines on those found to be involved in
civil disturbance. The costs of such measures were to be borne by the local
population. The ordinance also rendered officials involved in such actions
immune from liability. 197
As is clear by now, all such measures conformed to a well-established
practice of quasi-martial law. The Collective Punishment Ordinance was the most
unusual and extreme example of such a phenomenon however. It entrenched as
law several features deeply inimical to even a minimalist commitment to a
normative idea of the rule of law—not only immunizing itself from review, in a
metastasization of the typical declaration of immunity that might be passed in the
wake of a period of martial law, but also severing the link between individual
action and punishment. The Unsettled Districts Ordinance, meanwhile, was
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notable for its specific limitations on movement, reminiscent of the limitations
put in place in South Africa.

3. Conclusion: Suppressing the Press, Punishing the People
As with India, Nigeria was marked by a confluence of different legal orders,
applicable in different regions and contexts. This process took a step in Nigeria
never taken in India, however, as collective punishment was rendered into law
through the Collective Punishment Ordinance, presenting one of the bleakest,
most direct incorporations of the use of force into legal form imaginable. 198 The
presence of such a potential within the law itself, together with its accompanying
declaration of immunity in advance, bequeathed Nigeria a particularly troubling
legal legacy with which it would have to grapple in the decades to come.
The Newspaper and Seditious Offences Ordinances, on the other hand,
applied the more sophisticated approach to repression that has been traced in the
pages above. 199 The Newspaper Ordinance employed the effective, relatively
subtle strategy of requiring securities, while the Seditious Offences Ordinance
helped to extend fear and uncertainty by threatening prosecutions of any
statements offending the government. While the force of all such measures was
diminished by the government’s relatively weak institutional tools of enforcement,
on paper Nigeria came to possess the same layered system of repressive legal
measures we have seen elsewhere.
As with India and South Africa, the approach that developed in Nigeria
revealed the clear influence of the Irish model—in terms, for instance, of the
Nigerian administration’s reliance on the 1912 Unsettled District and Peace
Preservation Ordinances, as well as of the authorities’ heavy focus on attempting
to ensure the press, as well as other oppositional agents, might be silenced before
they could become effective. Nigeria also helped to expand those standards. In
particular, the 1909 Seditious Offences Ordinance’s punishment of those making,
publishing or circulating “statement[s], rumour[s] or report[s]” the authorities
deemed troublesome constituted a new manner of advancing the authorities’
traditional concerns with adversarial statements—and set a model that would be
widely followed in the years to come. Finally, the Nigerian authorities also
198

The ordinance would stay on the books and continue to be used for decades, earning the critique
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In addition, 1912 saw passage of the Theater and Public Performance Regulation Ordinance 1912,
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Censorship and the Content of Nigerian Home Video Films, 3 POSTCOLONIAL TEXT 1 (2007).

Summer 2019

53

Chicago Journal of International Law

managed to go further than most by incorporating a preexisting policy of
collective punishment into the frame of law. While that incorporation would not
prove quite so broadly influential, it certainly entrenched a particularly grave mode
of legal practice within Nigeria itself, the influence of which continues to be felt. 200
Moreover, in incorporating such an overtly repressive type of approach into the
law, the Nigerian colonial government also helped to show how far repressive
modes of legality could go.

IV. C ONCLUSION
Tracing origins is always dangerous. Wherever one begins, an important and
influential prehistory is left out. Nonetheless, some moments are more significant
than others. British rule over nineteenth century Ireland, this Article argues, was
fundamental to the development of the sorts of repressive public order laws and
institutions that are still to be found in operation across the world today.
Throughout the century, the British experimented with and developed innovative
new approaches to repression, not by the outright use of force as such—though
recourse to outright force was always a potential called upon when needed—but
rather through an increasingly thick, detailed, and extensive web of legality, in
which the repressive aims of the state were increasingly embedded.
Equally fundamental was the dissemination of the law developed in that
period to other regions of the British Empire. The previous Section explored such
dissemination in the context of India, South Africa, and Nigeria in particular.
While all three were particular important colonies in their own right, they have
also been presented here as examples, as the same phenomenon could also have
been tracked in many of Britain’s other colonies as well. The process of
dissemination helped to normalize the new approach for the simple reason that
what is normal is most essentially defined by what is common—hence, the more
colonies in which a particular approach was employed, the more it would seem
normal and thereby reasonable.
The manner in which repressive legislation developed in the period had
several notable features. As documented above, time and again the issuance and
development of repressive laws were not the product of active forethought, nor
were such laws implemented proactively. Rather, repressive measures were hastily
assembled in the moment, almost always as a reactive measure in the face of new
forms of resistance and growing nationalist sentiment. The form they took
therefore often had far more to do with the types of political advocacy and
organization they were designed to suppress than with any underlying theory of
the art of suppression.
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The repressive measures adopted took a great diversity of forms. Prior to
more direct confrontations, late eighteenth century laws in Ireland tended to target
assemblies, though more by targeting their manifestations, than by attempting to
develop the means to stop them from occurring or causing problems in the first
place. More direct confrontation around the turn of the century led to martial law
and other acts complimentary to martial law, such as the Suppression of Rebellion
Act. In addition, the period saw the passage of measures designed to bring martial
law slightly more seriously into regularized form. Most prominent here was the
Peace Preservation Act of 1814, which set an example followed time and again
over the century to come.
At the same time, a variety of other measures were used as well. Measures
specifically targeting associations—of which the Unlawful Associations Act of
1825 was the most pristine early example—as well as laws employing new
methods to control assemblies, such as the Party Processions Acts and the
Suppression of Disturbances Act of 1833, allowed for a degree of control
extending beyond the declaration of certain districts as proclaimed, and the
admission of a lack of control that entailed. The 1882 Prevention of Crimes Act
was meanwhile innovative both in its emphasis on the crime of intimidation, and
in its emphasis on the importance of controlling the press.
As the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth, it is not so much that
British attention to Ireland diminished, as that its attention to the rest of its empire
increased. As the British increased the strength of their control and the extent of
their involvement, however, the strength of national resistance forces increased in
turn, leading to the cycle of resistance, institution of repressive laws, and further
resistance that would characterize colonial rule through to its end. As they turned
their attention to other areas, the British continued to employ the quasi-martial
law peace preservation model, with laws explicitly named as such in South Africa
and Nigeria, and the similar-in-substance Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act in
India. These laws generally partook more directly of one or another component
of the martial law legacy discussed above, be it the ability to declare certain districts
proclaimed, authorization of detentions and searches, the imposition of curfews
and other controls on movements, or allowance for special judicial proceedings.
As time went on, the British also increasingly employed a more
differentiated, subtle, prospective, and intrusive range of legal measures as well.
These included laws aimed at limiting criticism generally, such as the Telegraph
and Post Office Acts in India and the Seditious Offences Ordinance in Nigeria;
at the press in particular, such as the Law relating to the Registration of
Newspapers in the Transvaal, the Newspaper Ordinance in Nigeria and the
Newspaper and Press Acts in India; and at assemblies, such as the Preservation of
Order Act in Bombay and the Riotous Assemblies and Criminal Law Amendment
Act in South Africa.

Summer 2019

55

Chicago Journal of International Law

The move from quasi-martial law governance to rule of law repression was
marked above all by a shift to the targeting of the core civil and political rights—
freedom of expression, association, and assembly. Amongst other features, this
helped to reveal how close all of those rights are—with the targeting of any one
likely to impact the other two, and with the targeting of each an attempt ultimately
to target the same underlying phenomenon: the existence of a populace with its
own points of view, a desire for democratic political expression and selfgovernance, and a resistance to British rule.
This emphasis on targeting expression, association, and assembly also
demonstrated one of the most important features of the gradually evolving
regime: its emphasis on attempting to suppress and control dissent before it
reached more directly troubling levels. The authorities did this by extending the
reach of the law whenever and however possible, through such means as the use
of broad and vague standards, an emphasis on effect rather than intent, and the
imposition of various unnecessary restrictions and limitations on the rights in
question. In addition to the various vague provisions of the law, the law’s
uncertainty was also advanced by the existence of multiple overlapping regimes,
generated by the haphazard deployment of repressive measures. Together, these
various features served to extend the shadow of the law, rendering individuals
uncertain of exactly when and how the law might be deployed, certain only of the
need to avoid provoking the authorities’ ire.
Also noteworthy is a feature this Article did not dwell on, but which
deserves substantial exploration in its own right: the rising targeting, particularly
from the late nineteenth century on, not only of general unrest and independence
struggles, but also of labor movements. This concern was clearly discernable in
the Criminal Law and Procedure Act of 1887 in Ireland, 201 as well as in the Riotous
Assemblies and Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1914 in South Africa. 202 A
number of the frameworks examined, moreover—including the Peace
Preservation Act of 1870 in Ireland, the Indemnity and Peace Preservation Act of
1902 in the Transvaal, and the Unsettled District Ordinance of 1912 in Nigeria—
targeted the figure of the “wandering troublemaker,” a figure standing
alternatively for the nationalist or labor agitator, the non-worker, and the
troublesome native, by allowing the authorities to remove or prohibit the entry of
certain persons from or into restive areas. 203
A limited set of rhetorical framings were relied upon time and again to justify
the repressive measures surveyed. Several, as we have seen, were classified as peace
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preservation laws or ordinances. The reference to peace suggested the alternative
was war, serving both to justify the imposition of more forceful measures, and to
present those against whom such measures were taken as a form of enemy
combatant. Others relied on another old frame, presenting challenges to British
rule as a form of sedition or treason—powerful words that likely already seemed
archaic at the time, but which were perhaps less ideologically effective insofar as
they acknowledged the true nature of the struggle in question as one between the
will of the sovereign and that of his or her subjects. References to public order
took the next step, however, suggesting that the population at large, rather than
the sovereign at such, constituted the party injured by political dissent. Recourse
to the criminal frame, meanwhile, went a step further, suggesting those presenting
oppositional views were not enemies to the authorities, but rather a threat to their
neighbors, and that hence action by the authorities against them was a public
service.
It is also worth observing the volume of repressive legal content that was
generated over the course of the nineteenth century imperial venture. The laws
referenced herein are reproduced in a table attached as an appendix below. While
a substantial portion of the more overt repressive measures advanced through
legislation within the colonies and periods in question have been surveyed here,
they represent only one part of the bigger picture, in terms of the repressive legal
tools available to the authorities. The extent of the legal regimes in question served
multiple purposes. The existence of an extensive, detailed, carefully composed
legislative regime helped to promote the appearance of such regimes as legal as
such. At the same time, the extensiveness of such regimes helped to render those
subject to them uncertain as to the standards governing their conduct, just as the
efforts made within the context of particular pieces of legislation to capture every
form of prohibited conduct imaginable served not the purpose of clarity, but
rather of giving the laws in question their broad, vague, and flexible character.
Finally, it is possible to return to the broadest theme. As observed in the
introduction, lawyers have typically imagined states of emergency as one thing,
‘normalized’ law another. This mode of classification has been produced by a
relatively narrow attention to states of emergency and martial law, which jurists
have attempted to quarantine and cabin off, in order to prevent their
contamination of the everyday legal frame.
This history suggests, therefore, the need to move away from an
understanding of the exceptional and the normal as governed by a strong binary
division, and towards an understanding of the extent to which everyday legality
has already been infected by exceptional repressive measures. Such a perspective is
particularly urgent in light of the simple fact that, as highlighted in the
introduction, the repressive legal approaches examined above are not simply a
matter of historical curiosity. Rather, it is possible to discern in the period studied
the roots of innumerable patterns and modes of rights violation still widespread
Summer 2019

57

Chicago Journal of International Law

in former colonies, as well as in Britain itself. Recognizing both the exceptional
and colonial roots of these practices and modes of legality, therefore, should serve
as a forceful reminder of the extent to which contemporary legal orders are in
need of reform.
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Appendix: Table of Repressive Laws Highlighted
Act
Tumultuous
Risings Act

Year
1775

Country
Ireland

Riot Act

1787

Ireland

Convention Act

1793

Ireland

Insurrection Act 1796

Ireland

Suppression of 1799
Rebellion Act
Peace
1814
Preservation
Act
Insurrection Act 1822

Ireland

Unlawful Oaths 1823
Act
Unlawful
1825
Societies Act
Tumultuous
1831
Risings Act

Ireland

Party
1832
Processions Act
Suppression of 1833
Disturbances
Act

Ireland

Crime
and 1847
Outrage Act

Ireland
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Ireland
Ireland

Ireland
Ireland

Ireland

Effect
Penalized those engaged in assemblies leading “to the
terror of his Majesty’s subjects”, allowed magistrates
to compel persons to appear before them to provide
evidence
Extended Riot Act to Ireland, sentenced to
transportation those administering or taking oaths,
allowed capital punishment of those engaged
in/encouraging riots
Made political assemblies illegal, required their
dispersal
Imposed death penalty on those administering illegal
oaths, allowed for proclamation of disturbed districts,
allowed curfews, allowed suspension of jury trials,
expanded powers of search and detention
Authorized trials by court martial
Created a new constabulary force, allowed for the
proclamation of disturbed districts where magistrates
and additional forces could be deployed
Introduced a curfew, allowed for summary justice
procedures
Declared associations using oaths unlawful
Outlawed advocacy associations and associations
founded on a discriminatory religious basis
Imposed new criminal penalties on certain protestors
and those encouraging protesting, and fines on
uncooperative witnesses
Prohibited the use of certain symbols in assemblies
Allowed for prohibitions of assemblies generally, and
allowed proclamation of disturbed districts, where
assemblies could be banned even more extensively,
curfews imposed, and court martial were authorized
Allowed for the proclamation of districts, in which
additional police might be brought, wider powers of
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search were granted, and the authorities gained the
power to compel persons to assist them in
apprehending murder suspects
Prohibited the use of certain symbols in assemblies

Party
Processions Act
Peace
Preservation
Act

1850

Ireland

1870

Ireland

Protection
of
Life
and
Property Act
Peace
Preservation
Act
Protection
of
Persons
and
Property Act
Prevention of
Crimes Act
Criminal Law
and Procedure
Act

1871

Ireland

1881

Ireland

Prohibited the possession or carrying of arms

1881

Ireland

Allowed indefinite detention of individuals suspected
of treasonous practices in prescribed districts

1882

Ireland

1887

Ireland

Vernacular
Press Act
Telegraph Act
Post Office Act
Preservation of
Order Act
Prevention of
Seditious
Meetings Act
Newspaper
(Incitement to
Offences) Act
Press Act

1878

India

1885
1898
1902
1907

India
India
Bombay
(India)
India

Penalized intimidation, allowed seizure/censorship of
newspapers
Allowed for proclamation of disturbed areas in which
summary procedures could be used, prohibited
certain associations, penalized boycotts and
assemblies more broadly
Allowed censorship, penalized papers for seditious
publications
Prohibited obscene or subversive writings
Reiterated and entrenched the Telegraph Act
Provided extensive powers of control over assemblies

1908

India

Stipulated that printing presses would be forfeited
where papers incited violence

1910

India

Required a large deposit be made for newspapers to
be registered

Extended the 1847/1856 measures, allowed summary
proceedings to be used in proclaimed areas, granted
magistrates the power to summon persons before
them, allowed for the arrest of strangers or those out
at night without a lawful purpose
Allowed broad powers of arrest and detention,
suspended habeas corpus

Allowed disturbed areas to be proclaimed, restricting
assemblies and public speech in such areas
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Prevention of 1911
Seditious
Meetings Act
Indemnity and 1902
Peace
Preservation
Act

India

Reiterated the 1907 Seditious Meetings Act

Transvaal
(South
Africa)

Law relating to
the Registration
of Newspapers
Riotous
Assemblies and
Criminal Law
Amendment
Act
Newspaper
Ordinance
Seditious
Offences
Ordinance
Collective
Punishment
Ordinance
Unsettled
District
Ordinance
Peace
Preservation
Ordinance

Transvaal
(South
Africa)
South
Africa

Instituted retroactive immunity; allowed for
expanded powers of arrest and search; punished
sedition; required permits; authorized expulsions; and
penalized the spreading of ‘false intelligence’,
seditious meetings, and censorship of treasonous
materials
Required extra press transparency, facilitated libel
proceedings
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1902
1914

Allowed for the prohibition and dispersal of public
gatherings, expanded the definition of incitement,
criminalized several labor organizing-related offences,
set up special courts

1903

Nigeria

Required newspapers to deposit securities

1909

Nigeria

Penalized those criticizing the government

1912

Nigeria

1912

Nigeria

Legalized collective fines and forced labor, ousted the
jurisdiction of the courts to hear challenges to its
application
Provided extended powers of arrest

1912

Nigeria

Allowed for the proclamation of disturbed districts,
extended powers of search and detention, immunized
those carrying out such policies
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